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EMPLOYMENT AS FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
Matthew T. Bodie*

ABSTRACT
Under traditional agency law doctrine, employees are agents of their
employers and owe an agent’s concomitant fiduciary duties. Employers,
in turn, are merely principals and have no corresponding fiduciary duties.
A new wave of thinking has unsettled this approach by concluding that
only high-level employees have fiduciary responsibilities to their
employers. Taking this controversy as a starting point, this Article
reconceives the employment relationship as a mutual fiduciary
relationship in which both employers and employees are fiduciaries of
one another. Even though current law does not consider employers to be
fiduciaries of their employees, employers have long had significant
statutory and common-law responsibilities toward their employees that
reflect a fiduciary character. Looking to these responsibilities as well as
research on the theory of the firm, the Article argues that employers are
fiduciaries and must refrain from opportunism, especially when
employees have no voice in governance. However, in an organizational
setting where employees do participate in governing the firm, it would be
appropriate to recalibrate the reciprocal fiduciary duties to require a
balanced set of obligations between all parties.
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INTRODUCTION
Are employees fiduciaries of their employers? The question seems
largely settled. The hoary “master-servant” doctrine holds that employees
are agents of their employers and owe traditional fiduciary duties.1
1

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §
7.07(3)(a) (2006).
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However, this blanket coverage of all employees has increasingly
disturbed labor and employment law academics, who have pointed out
that the fiduciary duties within the relationship seem fairly one-sided.2
Indeed, it seems jarring to juxtapose an agent’s selfless duties of loyalty
and performance with an employer’s minimal obligations under
employment at-will.3 After all, fiduciary duties are traditionally called into
being to protect the vulnerable against depredations from those with
power over them. The resulting critique has left the existence as well as
the strength of employee fiduciary duties open to question. The recent
Restatement of Employment Law only applies the traditional fiduciary
duty of loyalty to employees “in a position of trust and confidence.”4 Other
employees have only a limited duty of loyalty with respect to trade secrets
or a contractual duty of loyalty.5 As the Restatement commentary
describes: “As a general matter, the duty of loyalty stated in this Section
has little practical application to the employer's ‘rank-and-file’ employees . .
. .”6
The debate over employee fiduciary duties is just the tip of a larger
set of unresolved issues that make up the complicated fiduciary
relationship between employees and employers. In a similar way, the
2

See Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and “Un-American” Labor Law, 82

N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1726 (2004) (“Such duties are unidirectional: workers are required to be
loyal to their employers, but employers owe no reciprocal duty of loyalty.”).
3
See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Adam Barry, Contingent Loyalty and Restricted Exit:
Commentary on the Restatement of Employment Law, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 413,
419 (2012) (“The employer owes no duty of loyalty to the employee and is free to pursue
its self-interest by firing him to hire another for a lower wage or for better skills. Yet the
employee's ability to pursue her own self-interest by seeking better opportunities is
limited.”); Michael Selmi, The Restatement's Supersized Duty of Loyalty Provision, 16
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 395, 402-03 (2012) (noting that “some, though not many, courts to
hold that at-will employees owe no duty [of loyalty] to their employer, while many other
courts impose only a limited duty of loyalty on at-will employees, for to do otherwise
would go beyond what the parties presumably bargained for”).
4
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) (2015).
5
Id. (“Other employees who come into possession of the employer's trade secrets owe a
limited fiduciary duty of loyalty with regard to those trade secrets. In addition, employees
may, depending on the nature of the employment position, owe an implied contractual
duty of loyalty to the employer in matters related to their employment.”).
6
Id. § 8.01 cmt. a.
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traditional “master-servant” doctrine7 provides an obsolete and facile legal
label for a much richer and entangled set of legal relations. The legal
obligations between employer and employee do not, in fact, run all one
way; the employees’ duty of loyalty is but one facet of a multi-faceted set
of obligations and responsibilities. Recognized in the context of this more
nuanced relationship, employee fiduciary duties become less threatening
and more understandable. But they do not stand alone. The employer
itself has myriad fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary responsibilities to
employees that have not been recognized as such or have not been given
their appropriate weight. Employees and employers have multiple and
interwoven fiduciary responsibilities to each other and amongst
themselves that structure the employment relationship. As a result, it is
appropriate to say that employers are fiduciaries, too.
This Article will explore the complexities of the fiduciary
relationship between employees and employers. It will support the
traditional approach that employees owe fiduciary duties to their
employers. However, it will also argue that employers owe fiduciary or
quasi-fiduciary duties—some through fiduciary common law, many
through statute—to their employees. We have seen the progression of
these responsibilities grow over time: minimum wages, overtime, pension
benefits, time for parental and medical leave, and most recently health
insurance mandates. Although these duties are often categorized as
regulatory,8 they are in fact better characterized as organizational and
relational duties: duties that derive from the employer-employee
relationship itself. The relationship between an employer and its
employees is best seen not as an adjunct of the principal-agent
relationship, but rather as a new and more appropriate organizational
designation.

7

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) (referring to the employer as “master” and
the employee as “servant”).
8
See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Labor Law Reform Again? Reframing Labor Law as a
Regulatory Project, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 385 (2013) (arguing that labor law
should be reframed “as part of the larger societal project of regulating work and working
conditions”).
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Critical to this new approach is the understanding that employees
participate in the economic enterprise of the employer.9 They are not
passive inputs, but rather part and parcel of the employer as an
independent economic entity. Employment is a meaningful legal category
because employees fall within the boundaries of the firm and are, in
important ways, the firm itself. As such, they are responsible for and are
the responsibility of the employer. The mutual relationship between the
entity that acts as the legal employer and the employees that have been
hired by that entity is what generates the duties between employer and
employee—and thus, in an important way, between one employee and her
fellow employees.
Part I of the Article explores the traditional fiduciary duties
between employer and employee as set forth by the common law of
agency and employment law. Part II examines the employment
relationship from the perspective of the theory of the firm.
Part III sets forth the manifold common law and statutory duties that
employers owe to employees, including what could be regarded as
traditional fiduciary duties. Part IV discusses prior theories of employer
fiduciary duties and introduces a new approach based on fiduciary theory
and the theory of the firm. Finally, Part V looks at how the role of
employees in the governance of the firm should shape the fiduciary duties
that employers and employees owe.

I. EMPLOYEES AS AGENTS
Under the traditional common law, employees have been defined as
a subspecies of agent whose actions were particularly aligned with the
principal. The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines servants as “an
agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is

9

See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

661, 705 (2013) (discussing employment as participation).
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subject to the right to control by the master.”10 The so-called “control” test
is the dominant standard for employment, both nationally and
internationally. The basics of the control test are straightforward. A
servant is one who is “under the duty of rendering personal services to the
master or to others on behalf of the master.”11 In addition, the master
must have the “right to control the servant’s work,” which means “being
entitled to tell the servant when to work (within the hours of service) and
when not to work, and what work to do and how to do it.”12 This right of
control is what separates master-servant from the principal-agent.
To a great extent, this traditional definition still holds in the law.
The Supreme Court has made the common-law “control” test into the
default definition for “employee” whenever used without further
explanation in a federal statute.13 The Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Family and Medical Leave Act define “employ” as “suffer or permit to
work,”14 and the Supreme Court has recognized that the FLSA definition
may extend to cover workers beyond the reach of the common law agency
test.15 Outside of these statutory contexts, however, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that the “control” test is to apply as the default rule. That is
not to say, of course, that the control test is easy or straightforward to
apply. The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides a ten-factor
balancing test for determining whether the potential master/employer is

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006) (defining an employee as “an agent whose principal controls
or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent's performance of work”).
11
FRANCIS R. BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 6 (1929), quoted in Ronald H. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 403-04(1937).
12
Coase, supra note RC1, at 404.
13
See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989) (“In the
past, when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded
that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as
understood by common-law agency doctrine.”).
14
29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2012) (FLSA); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2012) (FMLA) (referencing FLSA
definitions).
15
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that the FLSA
“stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such
under a strict application of traditional agency law principles”).
10
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exercising control.16 As the Restatement commentary acknowledges, this
employment relationship is “one not capable of exact definition.”17
Because agency law has taken the lead in defining the legal
meaning of “employee,” and because agency law has always treated
employees as a subcategory of agent,18 employees have been naturally
assumed to be agents. As agents, employees have traditionally owed the
same fiduciary duties that agents owe to their principals.19 These duties
can be roughly categorized into two types: duties of loyalty and duties of
performance.20 The duty of loyalty is perhaps the more prominent; it
requires the agent to “act solely for the benefit of the principal in all
matters connected with his agency.”21 Nested within this overall duty are
the duties to not take business opportunities from the principal,22 to not
deal with the principal on behalf of an adverse third party,23 to not
compete with the principal during the agency relationship,24 to not use the
principal’s property for the agent’s own purposes, and to not disclose the
principal’s confidential information.25 As to duties of performance, the
agent has the duty to exercise reasonable care, competence, and
16

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) (including such factors as “whether
or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business,” “the skill
required in the particular occupation,” and “whether or not the work is a part of the
regular business of the employer”).
17
Id. § 220 cmt. c.
18
Id. § 2 cmt. a (“A master is a species of principal, and a servant is a species of agent.”).
19
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958) (characterizing agency as a fiduciary
relation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (same).
20
See id. §§ 8.02-8.12. See also Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049,
1049 (2007) (“Within common law agency, an agent owes the principal fiduciary duties of
loyalty as well as duties of performance.”).
21
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §
8.01 (2006) (stating that the agent has “a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s
benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship”). See also Benjamin Aaron,
Employees' Duty of Loyalty: Introduction and Overview, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 143,
144 (1999) (stating that the duty of loyalty in general "require[s] the employee [to] behave
during the period of employment so as to enhance, rather than harm or hinder, the
business interests of the employer").
22
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (2006).
23
Id. § 8.03.
24
Id. § 8.04.
25
Id. § 8.05.
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diligence,26 to follow instructions,27 to act reasonably and refrain from
damaging conduct,28 to provide information,29 and to segregate the
principal’s property.30 In contrast, the principal only has limited duties to
the agent. Outside of contractual duties,31 the principal has a limited duty
to indemnify the agent32 as well as a duty to provide information regarding
potential for physical harm or pecuniary loss.33
As a matter of doctrine, it seems hard to argue with the agency
account of employment. If an agent is one who acts on behalf of a
principal and is subject to the principal’s control, then employees are
agents-plus, or mega-agents—a special category of agents that are
particularly tied to the principal. While many agency relationships are
temporary and task-oriented, employment is seen as a wider-ranging and
longer-lasting version wherein the employee is given greater discretion to
act on behalf of the principal.34 Moreover, the employee shares the
characteristics of the agent that have called forth a specific body of agency
law—namely, that the agent is given particularized power to act on behalf
of the principal.35 Because the agent has discretion to act on behalf of the
principal, the principal is vulnerable to the agent’s use of this power.36
Similarly, employees acting on behalf of the interests of another entity

Id. § 8.08.
Id. § 8.09.
28
Id. § 8.10.
29
Id. § 8.11.
30
Id. § 8.12.
31
See id. § 8.13.
32
Id. § 8.14.
33
Id. § 8.15. The Restatement (Third) frames this duty as part of the overall duty of good
26
27

faith and fair dealing.
34
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) (“The word ‘servant’ is used in contrast
with ‘independent contractor’. The latter term includes all persons who contract to do
something for another but who are not servants in doing the work undertaken.”).
35
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006) (“As defined by the common law,
the concept of agency posits a consensual relationship in which one person, to one degree
or another or respect or another, acts as a representative of or otherwise acts on behalf of
another person with power to affect the legal rights and duties of the other person.”).
36
Id. (“The common-law definition requires that an agent hold power, a concept that
encompasses authority but is broader in scope and connotation.”).
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(the employer) are agents and should be bound by the same set of
fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty.
Two sets of critiques could be leveled against this status-based
approach to employee-as-agent: one related to agency more generally, and
one related to employment specifically. First, there is a generalized
critique of fiduciary law that is based on the status of the parties at issue.
Because of the immense variability within recognized categories of
fiduciaries, many academics have argued that status-based fiduciary
relationships are inherently suspect.37 To provide one prominent example,
Paul Finn contended that “it is meaningless to talk of fiduciary
relationships as such. Once one looks at the rules and principles which
actually have been evolved, it quickly becomes apparent that it is pointless
to describe a person . . . as being a fiduciary.”38 Given the wide variety of
agency relationships, it could be argued that agents are too diffuse and
variegated a category to ascribe as fiduciary in nature per se. However,
there is a “general consensus” that agency is presumptively fiduciary in
nature, based on the authority and discretion that the agent has to act on
behalf of the principal and bind the principal.39 The very definition of
agent is one who acts on behalf of another.
The second, more specific critique of the employment-agency
paradigm calls into question the application of the agent’s traditional
fiduciary duties to the employment relationship. An agent’s fiduciary
duties, although somewhat vaguely defined, are fairly extensive. In
particular, agents have the duty of loyalty to the principal—the duty to
“act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his
agency.”40 This self-abnegation is a critical aspect of the agency
Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 63, 65 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). (“The dominant
academic view is that the fiduciary relationship is indefinable. . . . Judges treat the
fiduciary relationship as conceptually central to fiduciary liability; leading academics
deny the coherence of the concept.”).
38
PAUL D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 1 (1977).
39
Miller, supra note PMFR, at 79.
40
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958). See also Aaron, supra note BA1, at
144 (stating that the duty of loyalty in general “require[s] the employee [to] behave during
the period of employment so as to enhance, rather than harm or hinder, the business
interests of the employer”).
37
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relationship, as it balances out the agent’s power to step into the shoes of
the principal and act on the principal’s behalf. But many scholars have
criticized the duty as unfairly one-sided in the employment context. The
at-will presumption allows employers to fire employees (and employees to
quit) at any time and for a variety of reasons having nothing to do with
performance.41 In comparison, under fiduciary law only one of the two
parties must be “loyal” to the other; the employer has no fiduciary duties
with respect to the employee. The duty of loyalty seems particularly
onerous when framed in terms of the “faithless servant.” According to this
doctrine, an employee who violates the duty of loyalty must disgorge the
entirety of her wages for the period of disloyalty.42 These doctrines work to
disempower the employee.43 The employee can be let go at any time and
for a variety of reasons, but the employee must always act in the interest of
the employer.44 Although at-will employment and the employee’s duty of
41

See Selmi, supra note MS1, at 397 (“The beauty of the employment at-will relationship,

it is often said, is its reciprocity: neither employees nor employers are bound to continue
the relationship.”).
42
Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment Law,
Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777 (“The quaintly named ‘faithless
servant’ doctrine requires employees subject to it not merely to pay damages for their
derelictions, but also to disgorge the compensation paid during the period of faithlessness
without any right to recover in quantum meruit for the value the employee may have
provided during that time.”).
43
In addition, the origins of “master-servant” doctrine came at a time when employer
obligations were generally to a term of employment, rather than at-will. See Matthew W.
Finkin, An Employee's Right Not to Obey Orders in the United States , 31 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 497, 497 (2010) (“Under the common law of master and servant that governed the
employment relationship in the United States from the Federal period until the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, non-casual labor was commonly contracted for a fixed
duration or was held to be for a fixed term as determined by the usage of the trade or,
later, by the periodicity of payment.”). The employer thus had duties to the employee
regarding grounds for termination and even the scope of the employee’s duties to obey
the employer. Id. (“An employee discharged for refusal to obey what he believed to be an
unlawful or unreasonable order could sue for breach of contract, it being a question for a
jury whether the order disobeyed was lawful and reasonable, although the standard of
unreasonableness sufficient to justify disobedience was rather high . . . .”).
44
Fisk & Barry, supra note F&B1, at 418-19 (“The employer owes no duty of loyalty to the
employee and is free to pursue its self-interest by firing him to hire another for a lower
wage or for better skills. Yet the employee's ability to pursue her own self-interest by
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loyalty are not necessarily contradictory, they point up a larger problem of
employee vulnerability. If fiduciary law is meant to protect the
vulnerable, as is often stated, then why does it protect employers and not
employees? Even if an employee might hold discretionary legal power in
her hands, is there any doubt about who holds the real power in the
relationship?
Broadly speaking, there are three potential approaches to these
concerns about employee fiduciary duties. The first approach would be to
argue for the creation/recognition of greater fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary
responsibilities from employers to employees in order to balance out the
disparity. As will be discussed below, the United States has actually
followed this approach much more extensively than commentators have
appreciated.45 However, employer duties have been imposed almost
entirely by statute; as a matter of fiduciary law, courts have not made
employers into fiduciaries and for the most part have not imposed
significant common law fiduciary duties on them. A second approach
would be to remove employees from the category of “agents” with respect
to agency law. From a doctrinal perspective, that approach seems
unsustainable: employees by definition act on behalf of their employers
and are subject to the employer’s right to control their work as
employees.46 However, some commentators have argued that rank-andfile employees do not genuinely have the power and discretion generally
attributed to agents, and that such low-level workers should not be

seeking better opportunities is limited. The employer can cast him or her onto the labor
market whenever it is in the employer's interest to do so, yet the employee is burdened
with an expansive duty of loyalty and can be contractually burdened with a non-compete
agreement, making it hard for the employee to find alternate employment when he or
she is back in the labor market.”).
45
See Part III infra.
46
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. g (2006) (“As agents, all employees owe
duties of loyalty to their employers. The specific implications vary with the position the
employee occupies, the nature of the employer's assets to which the employee has access,
and the degree of discretion that the employee's work requires. However ministerial or
routinized a work assignment may be, no agent, whether or not an employee, is simply a
pair of hands, legs, or eyes.”).

EMPLOYMENT AS FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

12

considered agents or fiduciaries.47 A number of jurisdictions have found
that employees are not subject to particular fiduciary duties, and at least
some have based this reasoning on the absence of a fiduciary
relationship.48
The third and most traditional approach to the imbalance between
employer and employee fiduciary duties is to acknowledge the existence of
employee fiduciary duties but to modify, weaken, or diminish their
content. The duty of loyalty, for example, has been held to apply only to
employee competition with the employer while the employee is still
working there.49 The loyalty duty becomes essentially an implied
covenant not to compete while one is still an employee. The
contemporary version of the duty has been described as “well defined”:
namely, that “employees can prepare to compete with their current
employer, but they must not solicit business and, in some circumstances,

Fisk & Barry, supra note F&B1, at 429 (“Not all employment relationships are fiduciary.
Most low-level employment relationships are strictly contractual, in the sense that the
employer has not put the employee in a position to affect its legal relations with third
parties and need not trust the employee to exercise discretion on the employer’s behalf in
order to get the benefit of the contractual relationship.”); Aline van Bever, When is an
Employee a Fiduciary?, 18 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 39, 42 (2014) (arguing that “it is not
the existence of an employment relationship as such, but the concrete circumstances of
the particular relationship, that put an employee in a fiduciary position”).
48
See Selmi, supra note MS1, at 397 (finding that “many, though not all, courts have seen
fit to treat the employment relationship as a principal-agent relationship”); TalentBurst,
Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 (D. Mass. 2008) (examining Massachusetts
law to conclude that conclude that “the duty of loyalty does not extend to ‘rank-and-file’
employees under Massachusetts law, absent special circumstances indicating they held a
position of ‘trust and confidence’”); Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 708 (N.C. 2001)
(holding that the circumstances regarding the employment relationship in question were
akin to “virtually all employer-employee relationships” and were therefore “inadequate to
establish [the employee’s] obligations as fiduciary in nature”). For a critique of the Dalton
decision, see Bret L. Grebe, Fidelity at the Workplace: The Two-Faced Nature of the Duty
of Loyalty under Dalton v. Camp, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1815, 1815-16 (2002) (“Though relying
on a traditional definition of the fiduciary relationship, the court applied that definition
narrowly and in derogation to common law agency principles.”).
49
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.04(a) (2015) (restricting competition by current
employees); id. § 8.05 (allowing former employee to compete in the absence of a covenant
not to compete or trade secrets).
47
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employees prior to leaving their employment.”50 The exact parameters are
a source of contention, particularly with respect to the extent to which
employees may work together to prepare for their exit.51 But such a
“narrowly circumscribed” duty does not appear particularly objectionable
to courts or particularly threatening to employee advocates.52 Moreover, it
appears to fit well within existing agency doctrine, which recognizes that
the duty of loyalty varies “with the position the employee occupies, the
nature of the employer's assets to which the employee has access, and the
degree of discretion that the employee's work requires.”53
However, there has also been a trend toward the elimination of the
duty of loyalty for the average, rank-and-file employee.54 The new
Restatement of Employment Law provides: “Employees in a position of
trust and confidence with their employer owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to
the employer in matters related to their employment.”55 Other employees
Selmi, supra note MS1, at 397. See also id. (finding a “clear consensus that sees the duty
serving a distinct but limited function relating to employees who leave for a competitor
or to start a competing business”).
51
Many courts allow employees to plan their “escape” as long as they do not actively
solicit clients for the new venture and do not use their time or the employer’s property in
furtherance of the new venture. See, e.g., Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 415, 419-20
(Mass. 1991) (“An at-will employee may properly plan to go into competition with his
employer and may take active steps to do so while still employed. Such an employee has
no general duty to disclose his plans to the employer, and generally he may secretly join
other employees in the endeavor without violating any duty to his employer . . . .”);
Illumination Station, Inc. v. Cook, No. 07-3007, 2007 WL 1624458, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Nov.
20, 2007) (refusing to dismiss a breach-of-loyalty claim against a sales representative who,
while employed, diverted customer orders to a rival company); Bancroft-Whitney Co. v.
Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 939 (Cal. 1966) (en banc) (holding that a corporation's president
breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty by recruiting subordinates for a competitor prior to
his departure); Eckard Brandes, Inc. v. Riley, 338 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) (duty of
loyalty violated when employee ran a competing pipe-repair business establishment while
still employed by employer).
52
Selmi, supra note MS1, at 403.
53
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. g (2006).
54
Leslie Larkin Cooney, Employee Fiduciary Duties: One Size Does Not Fit All, 79 MISS.
L.J. 853, 853-54 (2010) (contending that “applying the same agency principles to all
employees regardless of their level of power or ability to exercise discretion or affect the
employer's interests generates an uncalled for advantage to the employer”).
55
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) (2015).
50
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may owe a “implied contractual duty of loyalty” based on the nature of
their position, such as having access to certain accounts or critical
information.56 The agency relationship itself is insufficient, in the eyes of
the Employment Law Restatement, to create a duty of loyalty per se.57
Those employees with a “relationship of trust and confidence” are further
defined as “(1) employees who exercise substantial discretion and are not
subject to close supervision in carrying out their managerial, supervisory,
professional, or similar highly skilled work responsibilities and (2) the
employees who are entrusted with or come into possession of the
employer's trade secrets.”58 The commentary makes clear that
“[e]mployees falling outside either category do not owe a fiduciary duty of
loyalty to their employer but may nevertheless owe an implied contractual
duty of loyalty . . . .”59
Given the controversy over the duty of loyalty, it is perhaps not
surprising that employees’ duties of performance have largely been
ignored. The Restatement of Employment Law does not mention any such
duties, and actions by employers against employees on performance
grounds are largely nonexistent.60 Although directors and officers owe
their corporations a duty of care, these duties exist above and apart from

56
57

Id. at cmt. b & illus. 3.
Id. at cmt. b (“Courts often point to the agency relationship between the employer and

employee as the source of the duty of loyalty. But as the decisions make clear, labels from
agency law or elsewhere are no substitute for a fact-sensitive analysis of whether the
employee in question either occupies a position of trust and confidence sufficient to
trigger the fiduciary duty of loyalty, assumes a fiduciary duty for a limited time when
coming into possession of the employer's trade secrets, or is subject only to an implied
contractual duty of loyalty arising from the nature or circumstances of the
employment.”).
An earlier version of the section provided more generally that “[e]mployees owe a
duty of loyalty to their employer in matters related to the employment relationship.”
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2011).
58
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) cmt. a (2015).
59
60

Id.

Such cases generally only arise in the context of corporate directors and officers, and
even then are generally weak. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware's
Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589 (2006) (“In short, the classic duty of care no longer
exists in Delaware.”).
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the normal agency duties of performance.61 The Restatement (Third) of
Agency cites to employee cases with regard to the agent’s duty of good
conduct.62 However, these cases all provide employers with justification
for terminating an employee without notice in violation of a contractual
provision.63 Such justifications are not necessary in the at-will context.
Employee fiduciary duties, while seemingly straightforward as a
matter of agency doctrine, are rather more complicated as a matter of
practice. Courts and critics have questioned the existence of the agency
relationship within the employment relationship as well as the existence
and robustness of the duty of loyalty within that relationship. The policy
concerns that justify this disengagement of employment from agency law
largely revolve around the power imbalance between employer and
employee. Employee fiduciary responsibilities seem unbalanced when
employers do not have any fiduciary responsibilities of their own.
The doctrine behind employment as a fiduciary relationship is
unsettled because the doctrine is unmoored from the nature of the
relationship. Employees are not simply a type of agent; they have a
unique relationship with the employer and their fellow employees. This
relationship is best categorized as not as simply an agency relationship, but
61

The Restatement (Third) of Agency illustrates the agent’s duty to comply with lawful
instructions with reference to a loan officer’s disregard of the bank’s lending limits. The
Reporter’s Notes cite to Omnibank of Mantee v. United S. Bank, 607 So. 2d 76 (Miss. 1992),
which specifically reference an officer’s duties, rather than an agent’s. Id. at 84 (“By law,
officer Gray owed USB two principal duties: a duty of care and a duty of loyalty and fair
dealing. These duties differ in nature and content, though they doubtless intersect and
overlap. The law demands these duties of bank officers the same as officers of other
corporations . . . .”). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09, Reporter’s Notes to cmt.
c (2006).
62
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.10 cmt. b & illus. 2-4 (2006).
63
See McGarry v. St. Anthony of Padua Roman Catholic Church, 704 A.2d 1353
(N.J.Super.App.Div.1998) (holding that misconduct of an employee justified termination
without thirty-days notice); Griep v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 120 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1201
(D.Minn.2000) (misconduct justified termination without contractually-required notice
prior to discharge because employee breached “an implied contractual obligation … to
observe rudimentary principles of appropriate behavior”); Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
952 F.Supp. 1458 (D.Colo.1997) (upholding employer’s discharge of employee for letter
critical of employer's customer service for publication in newspaper, despite Colorado’s
off-duty conduct law, because of employee’s disloyalty).
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rather as an organizational relationship in which the parties have
overlapping fiduciary duties to one another. To better understand this
relationship, we begin with the economic theory of the firm, and the role
of employees within that economic concept.

II. EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE FIRM
To understand the nature of the employment relationship, we must
move beyond its origins in master-and-servant law. The “master-servant”
model imagines two separate and individual parties and their relationship
with one another. Particularly under pre-industrial English common law,
the master was an individual who ordered his servant or servants in a
direct, person-to-person relationship.64 In our modern economy, however,
the employer is generally not a person but instead a business organization.
This organization is a fictional “person” that represents the relationships
between a handful, dozens, hundreds, or thousands of parties. These
relationships between individuals for the purpose of carrying on a joint
economic enterprise are known in economics as a firm.65
The law conceives of a firm as a legal entity formed through state
organizational law, such as a partnership, corporation, or LLC.66 However,
these entities represent only the legal relationships between the fictional
legal entity and those who have ownership rights in the entity. To take the
64

See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 410 (1765) (“If an innkeeper’s servants rob his

guests, the master is bound to restitution; for as there is a confidence reposed in him, that
he will take care to provide honest servants, his negligence is a kind of implied consent to
the robbery.”).
65
See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783 (1972) (defining a classical firm as a
“contractual organization of inputs” in which there is “(a) joint production, (a) joint input
production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party who is common to all the contracts of
the joint inputs, (d) who has rights to renegotiate any input's contract independently of
contracts with other input owners, (e) who holds the residual claim, and (f) who has the
right to sell his central contractual residual status”).
66
Cf. ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 2 (2013) (describing a
legal theory of the firm); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 21 (2013)
(discussing the move “from the economic concept of the firm to the legal concept of the
business association”).
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most common organizational example—the corporation—the law
organizes the governance structure around equity investors and ignores
the relationship between corporation and employee. But as explained
below, the corporation as economic firm is made up not only of directors,
officers, and shareholders, but also of employees.
Employees have been central to our conception of the firm from the
start. In early neoclassical economics, the theory of firm was quite
rudimentary; it simply saw the firm as a black box which took in inputs
and produced outputs.67 Employees and capital assets were inside the
black box, while customers and suppliers were outside.68
When Ronald Coase revolutionized economic thinking about the
firm, he focused on employees.69 Coase contrasted firms with markets by
noting that outside of the firm, “price movements direct production,” while
within firms, markets are replaced by the entrepreneur-co-ordinator.70 The
reason for this replacement was that the price mechanism can be costly.71
In order to avoid the transaction costs of contracting, certain transactions
will be more efficiently conducted within a firm rather than on an open
market.72 The firm-based transactions described by Coase involve the
purchase of labor for a particular endeavor. In explaining these
transactions, Coase stated: “If a workman moves from department Y to
department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but
because he is ordered to do so.”73
The relationship between the entrepreneur-coordinator and the
employee is, in fact, the primary distinction between the firm and the
market. When Coase considered “whether the concept of a firm which has
been developed fits in with that existing in the real world,”74 his answer was
that “[w]e can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in
Charles R.T. O'Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31
J. CORP. L. 753, 757 (2006).
68
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1631 (2001).
69
Coase, supra note RC1.
70
Id. at 388 (footnote omitted).
71
Id. at 390–92.
67

Id.
Id. at 387.
74
Id. at 403.
72
73
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practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of
‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”75 Discussing the
common law “control” test at length, Coase cited to its provision that “‘[t]he
master must have the right to control the servant’s work, either personally
or by another servant or agent.’”76 Coase concluded: “We thus see that it is
the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer
and employee,’ just as it was in the economic concept which was developed
above.”77
In an important response to Coase’s work, Armen Alchian and
Harold Demsetz agreed that the employment relation is central to the
concept of the firm.78 However, they argued that Coase’s focus on control,
authority, and direction was misleading, particularly within an at-will
relationship.79 Instead, they argued that the importance of the firm (as
separate from the market) stems from the need to coordinate production
in the midst of a variety of inputs—the need for a system of “team
production.”80 Alchian and Demsetz defined team production as
“production in which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the
product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource.”81
Id.
Id. at 404 (quoting BATT, supra note FB1, at 6).
77
Id.
78
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note AD1, at 777 (“When a lumber mill employs a
75
76

cabinetmaker, cooperation between specialists is achieved within a firm, and when a
cabinetmaker purchases wood from a lumberman, the cooperation takes place across
markets (or between firms).”).
79
Id. (“To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a
deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in renegotiation of
contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties.”). As they put it:
Telling an employee to type this letter rather than to file that document
is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that
brand of bread. I have no contract to continue to purchase from the
grocer and neither the employer nor the employee is bound by any
contractual obligations to continue their relationship. Long-term
contracts between employer and employee are not the essence of the
organization we call a firm.

Id.
80
Id. at 777–78.
81
Id. at 779.
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The inability to measure individual contributions to productivity is what
makes the firm an efficient alternative to markets, but it is also the firm’s
central governance problem. Alchian and Demsetz argued that a
specialized, independent monitor may be the best way of insuring that the
team members all contribute appropriately and are rewarded
appropriately.82 That central monitor—the recipient of the residual
profits—would be the firm.83
Transaction costs, monitoring costs, and team production have
remained central concepts within theory-of-the-firm literature. The
transaction-costs model identified the types of contractual difficulties
which are likely to lead to firm governance, rather than market solutions.84
In situations where contributions and compensation can be harder to
define, the parties will be left with incomplete contracts that require a
governance structure to prevent opportunism. This opportunism will be
particularly problematic where one or both of the parties must invest
significant resources in assets specific to the particular firm, project, or
transaction. This asset specificity makes the parties susceptible to hold-ups

82

Id. at 782–83.

83

Alchian and Demsetz seemed to believe that the firm will be represented by a central
figure who has claim to the entire residual, and thus an interest in coordinating the firm
most efficiently. But they said nothing about who can appoint such a central figure, and
they express skepticism about the ability of shareholders to perform the monitoring
function. Rather than characterize shareholders as owners, they argued that shareholders
should be viewed merely as investors, like bondholders, albeit “more optimistic” ones.
They asked:
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship is one emanating
from the division of ownership among several people, or is it that the collection
of investment funds from people of varying anticipations is the underlying
factor? If the latter, why should any of them be thought of as the owners in
whom voting rights, whatever they may signify or however exercisable, should
reside in order to enhance efficiency? Why voting rights in any of the outside,
participating investors?

Id.

Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of
Empirical Research in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1 (2008) (discussing the

84

transaction costs approach).
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from their contractual partners in the absence of a system of governance.
Firms can be useful in providing the structures that deter opportunism.85
In the transaction costs model, employees’ contributions must be
recognized as assets of both the firm and the employee—often described as
“human capital.”86 Some types of human capital are transferable, such as
education or general skills, but other types are specific to the firm and
generally worthless outside it. To the extent an employee has invested in
firm-specific skills, she is subject to opportunistic behavior, since she has
little leverage to get the full value of those skills. In the transaction-cost
model, employees may be precisely the vulnerable yet valuable
contributors to the joint enterprise who are most vulnerable to
opportunistic behavior.87
The focus on assets has carried over into the “property rights”
theory of the firm, which posits that the firm should be owned by those
who contribute the most valuable and most asset-specific property to the
joint enterprise.88 This theory posits that firms are necessary as a
repository of property rights for assets used in joint production. By owning
the property outright, the firm prevents the problem of the commons (in
which no one holds property rights over valuable assets) as well as the
problem of the anticommons (in which property rights are divvied up
amongst too many disparate actors). The property-rights model dictates
that the firm should be owned by those who contribute the most valuable
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 114-15 (1985);
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47–48 (1996).
86
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21
J. CORP. L. 657, 663 n.26 (1996) (discussing the need for asset specificity at to the firm, and
highlighting firm-specific human capital, under Williamson’s transaction cost theory).
87
Indeed, Margaret Blair offers the following critique: “The tendency in the transactions
cost literature has been to recognize that firm-specific human capital raises similar
questions, but then to sidestep the implications of these questions for corporate
governance.” Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm,
in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 66 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds.,
2000).
88
See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); Sanford J.
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical
and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart &
John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm , 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
85
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and most asset-specific property to the joint enterprise. They are not only
most necessary to the firm’s success; they are also the most vulnerable to
hold-up problems as the joint enterprise moves forward in time. Although
the property rights discussed in the model are generally nonhuman assets,
the assets are “the glue that keeps the firm together” and thus keep
employees within the firm.89
Along these lines, the “access” model of power within the firm
defines a firm “both in terms of unique assets (which may be physical or
human) and in terms of the people who have access to these assets.”90
Access to the unique assets is what defines the power of the individuals
within and outside of the firm. Access is defined as “the ability to use, or
work with, a critical resource.”91 Examples of critical resources include
machines, ideas, and people.92 Access gives the employee the ability “to
create a critical resource that she controls: her specialized human
capital.”93 Control over this critical resource is a source of power.94 Given
the importance of access, the role of the firm is to allocate access
efficiently amongst the firm’s agents.95

HART, supra note OH1, at 57. Hart posed the following hypothetical: if firm 1 acquires
firm 2, what is to stop workers at former firm 2 from quitting and forming a new entity?
Hart’s answer: “there must be some source of firm 2 value over and above the workers’
human capital, i.e. some ‘glue’ holding firm 2’s workers in place.” Id. This source of firm
2’s value could be “a place to meet; the firm’s name, reputation, or distribution network;
the firm’s files, containing important information about its operations or its customers; or
a contract that prohibits firm 2’s workers from working for competitors or from taking
existing clients with them when they quit.” But there needed to be something, for
“without something holding the firm together, the firm is just a phantom.” Id. (footnotes
omitted).
90
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387,
390 (1998).
91
Id. at 388.
89

92
93
94

Id.
Id.

Rajan and Zingales argue that “[s]ince the amount of surplus that she gets from this
power is often more contingent on her making the right specific investment than the
surplus that comes from ownership, access can be a better mechanism to provide
incentives than ownership.” Id.
95
Id. at 391.
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Recent scholarship has taken the role of human capital even
further. One aspect of this capital—knowledge—has served as the basis for
a new set of approaches to the firm.96 Knowledge is defined both as
explicit sets of formal information as well as the ability to apply a
repository of unspecified information in developing an answer or approach
to a particular problem.97 Rather than emphasize the ownership of
physical assets, which can be fungible and nonspecific, the knowledgebased theory focuses on the need to produce, distribute, and ultimately
retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the firm.98 Knowledgebased theories of the firm provide an intersection for the economic,
organizational, and sociological theories as to the nature of the firm.99 In
See generally Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal
Institutions, and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101

96

NW. U. L. REV. 1123 (2007) (arguing that an organization’s structure is dependent on the
type of knowledge it requires); Sarah Kaplan et al., Knowledge-Based Theories of the
Firm: A Review and Extension, (Mass. Inst. Tech. Sloan Working Paper No. 4216-01, 2001)
(introducing a view of the firm that is knowledge-based), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.8.8829&rep=rep1&type=pdf;
Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human
Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (discussing legal
conceptions that govern the ownership of human capital within the workplace).
97
For a discussion of explicit versus tacit knowledge, see Ikujiro Nonaka et al., A Theory

of Organizational Knowledge Creation: Understanding the Dynamic Process of Creating
Knowledge, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING & KNOWLEDGE 491, 494 (Meinolf

Dierkes et al. eds., 2001). Gorga and Halberstam classify knowledge into three types:
“knowledge embedded in physical assets,” “knowledge embedded in the organizational
structure or the group of individuals that constitute the firm[,]” and “specialized
knowledge embedded in the individual.” Gorga & Halberstam, supra note GH1, at 1141–
42. As they explain, “[t]he way a firm develops the knowledge it will use in its production
process and the extent that the firm can bind this knowledge to its structure will
influence its organizational structure.” Id. at 1140
98
Id. at 1137 (criticizing the property rights theory for failing to account for the
importance of employees as assets). Along the same lines, a capability-based theory of the
firm has focused on firm-specific knowledge and learning that can be translated into joint
production. Thomas McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production and Work
Practices for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
135, 137–38.
99
See, e.g., Rajan & Zingales, supra note RZ1, at 424–25 (arguing that there is “ample
opportunity for gains from trade” between economics and sociology, as sociologists have
studied the role of power within organizations “in some detail”); D. Gordon Smith &
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fact, one set of scholars has examined the role of the firm as a
“collaborative community” in which employees work together toward
common goals.100
As these theories of the firm make clear, employees are part of the
firm in ways that other stakeholders such as suppliers, customers, and
lenders are not. If the firm is defined as an organization devoted to a
continuing economic enterprise, then employees and equity holders are
within the firm, and the other stakeholders are outside. This fits within
our common conception of what a “firm” is: a company “is” its executives,
its employees, and its shareholders, while it is not its lenders, suppliers, and
customers. Indeed, this is the purpose of drawing the line between
employees and independent contractors. Employees are part of the firm in
ways that independent contractors are not; they are participants in the
common economic enterprise of the firm.101 So employees have
continuing duties to the employer, the employer has continuing duties to
employees, and the employer is responsible for the actions of employees
taken within the scope of employment.
A firm-oriented approach to the employment relationship explains
why employers actually have a portfolio of legal responsibilities to their
employees and on behalf of their employees. Employers are not simply
helpless principals that depend on their employees to carry out their
actions. They are instead legal entities with power over the joint
production of the business enterprise carried on by equity and labor. As
such, it is natural that the law assigns them responsibilities to and on
behalf of their employees.

III. EMPLOYER DUTIES RELATING TO EMPLOYEES

Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) (comparing
organizational theories to the traditional legal and economic theories of contract and
firm).
100
See Paul S. Adler & Charles Heckscher, Towards Collaborative Community, in THE
FIRM AS COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY 11, 20 (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006).
101
Bodie, supra note MTB1.
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The fiduciary relationship between employee and employer looks
unbalanced from the perspective of agency law: the employee as agent
owes duties to the employer, but the employer owes no such duties to the
employee. But employers under current law owe myriad duties to their
employees and on behalf of their employees, not only under the common
law but also under statutory and regulatory law. These duties are explored
below.

A. Employer Duties to Employees
As discussed earlier, employers owe only minor fiduciary duties in
their role as principals: the limited duty to indemnify the agent102 as well
as a duty to provide information regarding potential for physical harm or
pecuniary loss.103 However, the common law has long placed particular
duties on employers in their role as employers. Since the Progressive Era
and the New Deal, employer duties have increased exponentially through
a blossoming of federal and state statutory schemes. Below is a brief
overview of these duties, categorized by subject matter.
1. Duties of workplace safety
Employers have duties to protect employees within the workplace
from a variety of sources. First, employers are liability for the torts of their
employees—not only when the victims are third parties, but also when the
victims are fellow employees. When one employee harms another as a
result of tortious behavior, the employer is liable if that tort was
committed within the employee’s scope of employment or if the employer
later ratifies the conduct.104 The Restatement of Employment Law also
provides for employer liability if a supervisor or manager commits a tort
outside the scope of employment, unless the employer took reasonable
care to prevent the conduct and the employee failed to take advantage of
this care.105 This latter extension of respondeat superior tracks the
102

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14 (2006).
Id. § 8.15. The Restatement (Third) frames this duty as part of the overall duty of good
faith and fair dealing.
104
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03(a) & (b) (2015).
105
Id. § 4.03(c).
103
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Supreme Court’s defense against vicarious liability under Title VII for
sexual harassment.106 Indeed, federal antidiscrimination statutes can be
likened to torts,107 and an employer also has responsibility for a hostile
work environment when that environment was created by a supervisor or
supervisors with authority over the employee.108 Employers also have a
common law duty to exercise care in selecting, retaining, and supervising
its employees,109 and they are liable for harm to employees caused by their
failure to exercise reasonable care in these responsibilities.110
Employers also have a common-law duty to provide a reasonably
safe workplace for employees and to provide warning of dangerous
working conditions.111 This duty dates back to master-servant law, whereby
“[a] master is subject to a duty that care be used either to provide working
conditions which are reasonably safe for his servants and subservants . . . or
to warn them of risks of unsafe conditions . . . that they may not
discover.”112 However, modern interpretation has held that the provision of
a warning does not obviate the need to provide a reasonably safe

106

Id. § 4.03 cmt. g.

Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2014) (“Courts and
commentators often label federal discrimination statutes as torts.”).
108
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998).
A similar duty has been found in tort. See, e.g., Ford v. Revlon, Inc. 734 P.2d 580, 584-85
(Ariz. 1987) (holding that a company's failure to investigate a complaint of sexually
abusive treatment is independent of the abusive treatment itself and that a company may
be liable for failing to stop the abusive treatment regardless of whether the treatment
itself rises to the level of an actionable tort).
109
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.04 (2015).
110
See, e.g., Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ohio 1991) (“[A]n employer
may be liable for failing to take appropriate action where that employer knows or has
reason to know that one of its employees poses an unreasonable risk of harm to other
employees.”); Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d
949, 973 (Utah 1992) (describing the elements of a claim of negligent employment as “(i)
[employer] knew or should have known that its employees posed a foreseeable risk of
retaliatory harassment to third parties, including fellow employees; (ii) the employees did
indeed inflict such harm; and (iii) the employer's negligence in hiring, supervising, or
retaining the employees proximately caused the injury”).
111
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.05 (2015). The duty has been recognized in all
U.S. jurisdictions. See id. at Reporters’ Notes for cmt. a.
112
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 492 (1958).
107
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workplace.113 The common-law duty has been supplemented and
expanded by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),114
under which employers similarly have a general duty to provide safe
working conditions.115 In addition to this general duty, OSHA provides for
a complex regulatory framework as established through promulgated
occupational safety and health standards.116
2. Duties of workplace privacy
The common law of torts provides for protections against privacy
invasions such as intrusions into private locations or the public disclosure
of private facts.117 These protections apply within the workplace as well.
Even though the employer generally provides the physical locations and
electronic resources that employees use for their work, employees can
develop expectations of privacy in these locations and resources.118 An
employer can thus be liable to an employee for, as examples, opening an
employee’s locker119 or reading an employee’s email,120 even when the
locker and email are provided by the employer. Employers also assume a
duty to prevent third parties, including certain other employees, from
accessing employee confidential information.121 The Restatement of
Employment Law considers employee information to be confidential if
“the employer has promised, by words or conduct, to keep the information
confidential or if the employer is required by law to treat the information
as confidential.”122 In some contexts, employers may be considered to be
113

RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.05 cmt. g (2015).
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012).
115
See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2012) (requiring employers to “furnish to each of his
employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized
hazards”).
116
Id. § 654(a)(2).
117
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D (1965).
118
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.03 (2015).
119
See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. Store 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1984) (providing
that employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace locker).
120
Restuccia v. Burk Tech., 1996 WL 1329386 (Mass. Super. Ct.) (denying summary
judgment against invasion-of-privacy claim based on search of employer-provided e-mail
account).
121
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.05 (2015).
122
Id. § 7.05 cmt. b.
114

EMPLOYMENT AS FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

27

information fiduciaries with respect to health data or other personal
information that the employer has collected through the employment
relationship.123
3. Duties regarding wage or income compensation
Under federal law, employers must provide a minimum wage to all
employees.124 The same statute provides that employees must receive oneand-a-half times their hourly wages if they work over forty hours per
week.125 These federal requirements are supplemented by state and local
minimum wage laws, many of which go well above the federal
minimums.126 Employers also have duties as to when and how often they
must pay their employees. Along with employer wage payment duties
under the common law,127 federal and state statutes require timely wage

123

Employers do not currently have specific federal statutory duties of confidentiality.
See Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the
Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 634 (2002) (arguing that a federal obligation is
necessary to “address the threat to health care confidentiality created by employer access
to protected health information”). Employer-sponsored plans do have certain limits on
disclosure to the employer. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.504(f) & 164.512(b)(v) (2001); Winn,
supra, at 670 (“Under the [HIPAA] Rules, health plans maintained by employers are
covered entities with similar duties to protect the confidentiality of personal health
information.”). However, federal regulations have been used to create a common-law
duty of confidentiality. See Ilene N. Moore et. al., Confidentiality and Privacy in Health
Care from the Patient's Perspective: Does Hipaa Help?, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 215, 231 (2007)
(“Because HIPAA places an affirmative duty on employers to properly train their
employees, employees' failure to comply may lend support to plaintiffs' invasion of
privacy or breach of confidentiality claims against employers.”). For a theory of employer
fiduciary duties in the context of health insurance, see Margaux J. Hall, A Fiduciary
Theory of Health Entitlements, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1729, 1737 (2014).
124
See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
125
See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).
126
See Irene Lurie, Enforcement of State Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws: Resources,
Procedures, and Outcomes, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 411, 436 (2011) (providing a table
of state minimum wage and overtime laws as of 2010).
127
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 3.01-3.05 (2015); see, e.g., id. § 3.01(b) (“Whether
compensation has been earned is determined by the agreement on compensation between
the employer and employee or any relevant binding promise or binding policy statement
on compensation made by the employer.”).
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payments and divisible portions.128 These mandatory rules displace
contractual arrangements upon which the parties might otherwise have
settled.129
4. Duties regarding benefits
Apart from wage and income compensation, employers have
generally not been required to provide certain benefits to employees as
part of employment. One exception is the unpaid leave required under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).130 Employers must provide their
employees with up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave a year for family or
medical leave and allow the employee to return to an equivalent
position.131 The Obama Administration has expanded paid medical leave
for federal employees132 and has proposed paid sick leave for all U.S.
workers.133
128

In the 19th Century, employers would often hire employees for a term but then only
pay them at the end of the term, and only if the employee completed the term. No
recovery for partial performance was permitted under contract, and employees were left
with a quantum meruit claim that was only intermittently successful. See, e.g., Stark v.
Parker, 2 Pick. 267, 293 (Mass. 1824) (denying recovery under quantum meruit); Britton v.
Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 482-83 (1834) (permitting recovery under quantum meruit). Modern
wage payment schemes require that employees be paid regularly and that they be paid
for all time worked, regardless of the length of term. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
LAW §§ 3.01 cmt. b (2015) (“Many states have wage-payment laws that determine the
mode and frequency of payment.”).
129
In some countries, a smaller set of minimum wage protections have been extended to
“dependent contractors” who work separately from the buyer but are dependent on the
buyer (and the buyer’s industry) for their livelihoods. See Brian A. Langille & Guy
Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View from Canada , 21
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 22–29 (1999) (discussing dependent contractors in Canadian
law).
130
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012).
131
Id. § 2612(a)(1).
132
Presidential Memorandum, Modernizing Federal Leave Policies for Childbirth,
Adoption and Foster Care to Recruit and Retain Talent and Improve Productivity, Jan. 15,
2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/15/presidential-memorandummodernizing-federal-leave-policies-childbirth-ad.
133
See Healthy Families Act, H.R. 1286, 113th Cong., March 20, 2013,
http://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1286 (requiring employers to
permit each employee to earn at least 1 hour of paid sick time for every 30 hours worked).
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As to other employee benefits, the law has mostly not imposed
duties to provide certain benefits, but rather has required employers to
provide them in a certain way, if they are provided at all. The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)134 does not require that
employers provide pension or welfare benefits.135 However, it does provide
mandatory standards for these benefits if they are provided, particularly in
the pension context. The Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA to borrow
principles from the law of trusts with respect to fiduciary obligations.136
Specifically, the administrator of an ERISA plan has the same
responsibilities as a trustee when it comes to administering the plan.137
This means that the officials must abide by their fiduciary responsibilities
when making decisions on behalf of the beneficiaries.138 The statutory
scheme provides for four primary fiduciary duties: the duty of loyalty to
plan participants,139 the duty of prudence,140 the duty of prudent
diversification of plan assets,141 and the duty to follow plan terms.142 In
addition, there are specific requirements about the operation of the plan.
Pension benefits must vest after a period of time, meaning that they
cannot be taken away by employer fiat.143 If the employer provides
134

Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29
U.S.C.).
135
Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 516 (2010) (“Congress enacted ERISA to ensure
that employees would receive the benefits they had earned, but Congress did not require
employers to establish benefit plans in the first place.”).
136
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989)(“ERISA's legislative
history confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions codify and make
applicable to ERISA fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of
trusts.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
137
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008) (stating that courts “should
analogize a plan administrator to the trustee of a common-law trust” and “should consider
a benefit determination to be a fiduciary act”).
138
Plan administrators need not follow the duty of loyalty when making decisions as a
trust settlor, as opposed to a trust administrator.
139
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2012) (also known as the exclusive benefit rule).
140
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
141
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
142
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
143
See, e.g., id. § 1053 (providing for minimum vesting standards for employee
retirement accounts).
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benefits through a defined benefit plan, the plan must be funded
appropriately as defined through a complicated series of requirements.144
If the employer provides benefits through a defined contribution plan, it
still owes the employee-beneficiaries duties of loyalty and following
instructions.145 The upside of this complicated regulatory scheme is a set
of tax savings for both employer and employee. However, this tax savings
is only available if the employer offers the benefits to a sufficiently broad
number of employees.146 This nondiscrimination principle prevents the
employer from segregating off benefits only for the fortunate few. 147
Until recently, health insurance plans were regulated primarily by
state law, with ERISA provide only framework protections.148 However, the
Affordable Care Act created a new set of incentives and requirements for
employers with respect to such insurance. The employer mandate
requires employers of a certain size to purchase health insurance for their
employees or provide funding for employees to buy their insurance on

144
145

See 29 U.S.C. §§1081-1086 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 412 (2012).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (providing an exemption for the duties of prudence and

diversification); LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008)
(“We therefore hold that although [ERISA] § 502(a)(2), [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)] . . . does
authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a
participant's individual account.”). See also Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoffer, 134 S. Ct.
2459 (2014) (discussing fiduciary duties of ESOP trustees).
146
ERISA’s so-called “nondiscrimination” requirements endeavor to achieve the “social
policy goal of ensuring that the employer’s rank and file employees benefit from the
employer’s qualified plan.” COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 164 (4th ed. 2015). Such requirements include minimum
coverage requirements, 26 U.S.C. § 410(b), and the prohibition against discrimination in
favor of highly compensated employees, 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(4). For further discussion, see
MEDILL, supra, at 163-204.
147
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 410(b)(1)(A) (requiring that the plan benefit at least seventy
percent of employees who are not highly compensated employees). But see Bruce Wolk,

Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront
Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (1984) (arguing that “despite its apparent

egalitarianism, [ERISA] is ill-suited to achieve Congress' goal of wide-spread pension
coverage for lower paid employees”).
148
Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of
Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1363-74.
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state exchanges.149 If employers fail to do so, they must pay a tax penalty.
Some commentators have predicted that the high cost of insurance will
lead employers to stop providing health benefits and instead pay the tax.150
However, to this point, it does not appear that most employers have
dropped coverage in light of the ACA mandate.151
Employers are also responsible for workplace injuries that require
medical treatment and may result in employee disability. Although such
responsibilities were handled through tort law up until the early 20th
Century, employers are now responsible for employee injuries through
workers’ compensation laws.152 The workers’ compensation model
represents a bargain between employer and employees, struck by state
legislatures: employees are covered for all workplace injuries without
having to prove employer fault, and employers are only liable for statutory
damages based on medical care and degree of disability.153 Employers
generally manage this responsibility through insurance.154

149

The employer mandate is developed in 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012). For a brief overview
of the employer mandate, see Suja A. Thomas & Peter Molk, Employer Costs and
Conflicts Under the Affordable Care Act, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 56, 58-59 (2013).
150
Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 127 (2011) (“[C]ommentators have
generally focused on the prospect that employers will choose to drop health coverage
entirely when ACA's core reforms are implemented in 2014.”).
151
See Don McCanne, Impact of ACA on employers and their employees, PHNP BLOG,
May 15, 2015, http://pnhp.org/blog/2015/05/15/impact-of-aca-on-employers-and-theiremployees/ (“Ninety-four percent of all surveyed organizations continue to provide health
care coverage for all full-time employees in 2015 and, among that group, nearly all plan
to continue coverage in 2016.” (citing study by International Foundation of Employee
Benefit Plans, http://pnhp.org/blog/2015/05/15/impact-of-aca-on-employers-and-theiremployees/)).
152
Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 53-59 (1967) (tracing the evolution of workers'
compensation insurance in the United States).
153
Shauhin Talesh, Insurance Law As Public Interest Law, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 985, 1001
(2012) (“[T]he workers' compensation system emerged from a desire to create a new,
workable, and predictable mode of handling accident liability that balanced the interests
of labor and management.”). Workers’ comp systems are largely described as strict
liability. There are exclusions in some states based on employee fault. MARC A.
FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 828, 834-35, 866-69 (8th ed. 2006)
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5. Duties regarding discipline and termination
The “employment at will” doctrine frames that relationship as
terminable at any time, with or without cause.155 Protections within that
relationship are largely contractual.156 However, the common law of tort
does render an employer liable for wrongful discharges in violation of
public policy.157 The employer has a duty not to fire an employee because
the employee refused to violate the law in the course of employment,158 or
because the employee abided by professional codes of ethics or conduct.159
The protections also extend to employees who report on employer
wrongdoing, either up the chain within the employer or directly to
outsiders such a government agencies or media members.160 The
wrongful discharge tort is a societal imposition on the flexibility of the atwill doctrine: that doctrine cannot be used to discharge employees when
they are acting in the public interest. It thus forges an alliance between
employees and the public against the employer when the employer
engages in harmful conduct.161 Employer discretion is also bounded by
numerous antidiscrimination statutory schemes that apply to employer
termination or discipline. Federal law protects employees from

(discussing how workers' compensation insurance replaced tort law with a no-fault
compensation scheme).
154
Anthony J. Barkume & John W. Ruser, Deregulating Property-Casualty Insurance
Pricing: The Case of Workers' Compensation, 44 J.L. & ECON. 37, 43 (2001) (noting that
“states generally require workers' compensation insurance coverage”).
155
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (2015).
156
See, e.g., id. § 2.02 (providing for contractual exceptions to at-will); § 2.03 (explaining
cause requirements for contractual agreements for employment as to a definite term); §
2.05 (explaining the role of employer policy statements within the employment
agreement); § 2.07 (discussing the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing within the
employment relationship).
157
Id. § 5.01.
158
Id. § 5.02(a).
159
Id. § 5.02(e).
160
Id. § 5.02(e) cmt. f.
161
For a discussion of the employee’s bifurcated loyalty between firm and polity in the
context of wrongful discharge doctrine, see Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational
Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 433 (2009).
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discrimination based on race, ethnicity, sex, religion, age, and disability.162
State and local laws provide additional protections for these categories as
well as additional ones, such as sexual orientation.163
When employees are discharged otherwise lawfully, state law
provides for unemployment compensation for a set period of time.164
These laws were originally designed to provide disincentives for employers
from firing workers by making them responsible for post-termination
remuneration.165 Although states manage their own systems, as a general
rule they require employers to pay into an unemployment insurance
fund166 and require compensation when the employee is terminated unless
the employee has quit or has engaged in significant malfeasance.167 Thus,
162

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (making it an unlawful practice to “discriminate

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012) (providing similar protections against age discrimination within
the employment relationship); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (providing similar protections
against disability discrimination).
163
1 Compensation and Benefits § 8:4 (“Nearly every state has a fair employment practice
(FEP) law, and most states also have their own administrative agencies to investigate
charges of discrimination and enforce these FEP laws. Almost 200 local jurisdictions also
have FEP laws and companion enforcement agencies.”).
164
See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 1051 (7th ed. 2011)
(“Fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have individual unemployment
insurance (UI) programs determining the length of unemployment insurance benefits
and their amounts for qualifying recipients.”). For an overview of the federal-state
unemployment insurance program, see U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment
Insurance Benefits, http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last
visited February 5, 2016).
165
JOHN A. GARATY, UNEMPLOYMENT IN HISTORY: ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PUBLIC POLICY
213 (1978) (discussing a 1932 Wisconsin law which required a reserve fund with payouts
to terminated workers).
166
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment Insurance Benefits,
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last visited February 5,
2016) (“In the majority of States, benefit funding is based solely on a tax imposed on
employers. (Three (3) States require minimal employee contributions.)”). However, the
federal government has provided significant funding for unemployment compensation,
particularly in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis. See ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra
note MRLL1, at 1051.
167
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment Insurance Benefits,
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last visited February 5,
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unemployment insurance only kicks in if the employee is not deemed (at
least in part) responsible for her termination.
6. Duties to bargain and allow collective representation
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)168 is the closest that labor
and employment regulation comes to addressing the management and
governance of the employer. Under the NLRA, the employer (whatever its
organizational form) must bargain with its employees’ chosen
representative over the employees’ terms and conditions of employment.169
A complex array of subsidiary obligations flow from this central one, such
as the prohibition against employer discipline or discharge because of an
employee’s protected concerted activity.170 The employer need not agree
to any specific set of terms, but it must bargain in good faith and abide by
the complex system of federal labor law for managing this bargaining
relationship.
Unlike other duties imposed upon employers within the
employment relationship, the duty to bargain does not require minimum
employment terms or impose substantive obligations on the employer’s
business. Instead, the NLRA makes employers negotiate with employees
as a group and prohibits employers from contracting individually with
employees outside of collective bargaining.171 Framers of the NLRA
intended to introduce a form of “industrial democracy” into the business

2016) (“You must be determined to be unemployed through no fault of your own
(determined under State law), and meet other eligibility requirements of State law.”).
168
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
169
Id. §158(a)(5) (holding it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees”).
170
See id. § 158(a)(1), (3) (2006) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—(1)
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 of this title; . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization . . . .”).
171
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (“The very purpose of providing by
statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of
employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the
welfare of the group.”).
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world and provide employees with a voice in workplace governance.172
Labor and management would work together to set the course for the
business, in a form of self-regulation. In fact, employers have exemptions
from certain ERISA responsibilities when they are in a collective
bargaining relationship or when they have arrived at a collective
bargaining agreement.173 The idea is that when employees have power
within the organization, there is less of a need to impose worker-friendly
terms from the outside.

B. Employer Duties on Behalf of Employees
In addition to duties owed to their employees, employers also have
duties to third parties on behalf of their employees. The oldest and bestknown of these duties are the employer’s responsibilities under respondeat
superior. An employer is liable for the acts of its employees committed
within the scope of employment.174 Although many different justifications
for the doctrine have been given, most center around the responsibility for
172

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: HEARINGS ON S. 1958 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 642 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1617, at 2028 (1949) (statement of
Senator Robert F. Wagner that “[t]hat is just the very purpose of this legislation, to provide
industrial democracy”).
173
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 410(a)(26)(E) (2012) (exempting multiemployer plans that benefit
only collective bargaining unit employees from certain minimum participation
requirements); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)--2(b)(7) (2012) (same).
174
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) (“An employer is subject to liability for
torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”).
employers are generally not liable for acts of independent contractors. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965) (“Except as stated in §§ 410–429, the employer of an
independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or
omission of the contractor or his servants.”). The Restatement (Second) of Torts
enumerates three exceptions: (1) the employer is negligent in “selecting, instructing, or
supervising the contractor;” (2) the employer has a nondelegable duty of care to the
public as a whole or the particular plaintiff; or (3) the work done by the contractor for the
employer is “specially” or “inherently” dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409
cmt. b (1965). The employer is also liable when it has performed a contract using
independent contractors when those services were accepted in the belief that they were to
be performed by the employer and its employees—an “apparent employee” scenario. Id.
§ 429.
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or control of the employer over the employee.175 United States common
law used to follow the “fellow servant” rule, in which the employer was
absolved of liability to an employee for an injury caused by a fellow
employee.176 However, this rule has rendered obsolete by workers
compensation statutes, and it would not likely remain the law if
reconsidered today.177 Employers may also be criminally responsible for
the misdeeds of their employees if committed within the scope of
employment.178 In order to satisfy the mens rea requirement, courts have
additionally required that the employee have acted with the intent to
benefit the business entity.179
Firms are also given responsibility for their employees when it
comes to taxes. Employers must withhold their employees’ taxes180 and
must pay a share of Social Security and Medicare (FICA)181 and
175

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499–501 (W.
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
176
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 474 (1958) (“A master is not liable to a servant
or subservant who, while acting within the scope of his employment or in connection
therewith, is injured solely by the negligence of a fellow servant in the performance of
acts not involving a violation of the master's non-delegable duties, unless the servant was
coerced or deceived into serving, was too young to appreciate the risks, or was employed
in violation of statute.”).
177
KEETON ET AL., supra note PK1, at 575–76; J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The
Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1487 (1987) (reviewing
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
(1987)) ("[T]he fellow servant rule is like a mastodon preserved in a glacier—it was
rendered obsolete by workers' compensation, and, given the general trend of twentieth
century tort law, there can be no question that if workers' compensation were abolished
today few courts would follow the fellow servant rule in industrial accident cases.").
178
See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
Although the “scope of employment” rule has faced steady criticism over the years, it has
become “firmly entrenched as, more or less, the across-the-board rule of enterprise
liability for all manner of crimes.” Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity
Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 475–76 (2006); see also Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability , 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994) (stating
that the existing legal regime closely approximates a rule of “pure strict vicarious
liability” (internal citation marks omitted)).
179
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962) (describing
the requirements as elements of liability taken from civil tort law).
180
26 U.S.C. §§ 3401(c), 3402 (2006).
181
26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3121(d) (2006).
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unemployment (FUTA) taxes.182 The IRS defines employees based on the
common law control test.183 Employer withholding extremely important
to the public fisc; payroll taxes alone make up 34 percent of all federal
revenues.184 And the consequences of an employer misclassification can be
extremely costly, as the business is then subject to the mandatory back-tax
formula.185
These employer duties—both to employees and on behalf of
employees to third parties—express the depth of the legal relationship
between employer and employee. The employee is not simply an agent
tasked with handling the principal’s matters; she is a part of the employer’s
responsibilities and both owes duties and is owed duties. These duties help
to paint a picture of a fiduciary relationship that runs not only from
employees to employers, but also from employers to employees.

IV.

EMPLOYERS AS FIDUCIARIES

This section explores potential theories for a set of fiduciary
obligations flowing from employers to their employees. It first addresses
why the contractual duty of good faith is not sufficient to handle the
relational aspects of the employment contract. Second, it discusses other
academic proposals for the creation of employer fiduciary duties. Finally,

182

26 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3306(i) (2006).
26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) (2006) (defining an employee as, among other definitions, “any
individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the
employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee”); 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)1(c)(2) (2012) (finding an employment relationship “when the person for whom services
are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the
services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details
and means by which that result is accomplished”); see 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) (2006) (stating
that “the term ‘employee’ has the meaning assigned to such term by section 3121(d)”);
Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298–99 (laying out a twenty factor test to aid in
“determining whether an individual is an employee under the common law rules”).
184
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Federal Payroll Taxes, April 2,
2014, http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-federal-payroll-taxes.
185
26 U.S.C. § 3509(a) (2006). In fact, Congress was moved to create a safe harbor.
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2885.
183
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it argues for the recognition of a reciprocal fiduciary relationship by
drawing on insights from fiduciary theory and the theory of the firm.

A. The Contractual Duty of Good Faith in the Employment Relationship
Given that employees and employers have a contractual
relationship, it may seem fruitful to explore a robust version of the duty of
good faith before looking to fiduciary duties. Indeed, good faith has been
characterized as “halfway between a fiduciary duty (the duty
of utmost good faith) and the duty merely to refrain from active fraud.”186
Good faith in performance is generally recognized as an implied term in
all contracts under the common law.187 The sense of the good faith duty is
that contractual partners owe obligations of performance that go beyond
the simple black letter of the agreement. Although these obligations do
not have exact definitions,188 several distinct threads have been noted. The
Uniform Commercial Code characterized good faith simply as “honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”189 One common expansion
upon this definition is the notion of good faith as an obligation to
Market St. Associates Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991). See also
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON.
425, 438 (1993) (“Good faith in contract merges into fiduciary duties, with a blur and not a
line.”).
187
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”);
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1431 (2014) (finding that “most States
recognize some form of the good faith and fair dealing doctrine”). The duty finds its roots
in traditional Roman and canon law, in which the doctrine imposed “an obligation to deal
honestly, forthrightly, and faithfully with one's commercial counterpart in both
negotiation and performance.” Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 611, 627-28 (2011).
188
Northwest, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1431 (“[I]t does not appear that there is any uniform
understanding of the doctrine’s precise meaning.”). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (“A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but
the following types are among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions:
evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of
imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure
to cooperate in the other party's performance.”).
189
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(19).
186
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effectuate the reasonable intentions of the parties – the spirit, rather than
the letter, of the contractual terms.190 Somewhat more rarely, the duty has
been used to ensure that “a party does not violate community standards of
decency, fairness, or reasonableness.”191 Courts could use good faith to
ensure that employers live up to the reasonable expectations of the parties
when it comes to the employment relationship, or to police businesses to
make sure that they were treating workers according to norms of fairness
and decency. Such a programme of good faith enforcement might
mitigate or obviate the need for additional employer fiduciary duties.
Ultimately, however, the doctrine of good faith in the employment
contract does not serve the same role as a fiduciary relationship. First,
purely as doctrinal matter, good faith has had a fraught history within
employment.192 Many jurisdictions refuse to recognize a duty of good faith
when the underlying employment agreement is at-will.193 Their refusal
stems from the complete discretion that at-will termination provides to the
employer. In their view, it is nonsensical to impose a duty of good faith
when the contract explicitly allows the employer to fire the employer for
any reason at all.194 If the employer has complete freedom to fire under
See Northwest, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1431 (noting that “some States are said to use the
doctrine to effectuate the intentions of parties or to protect their reasonable expectations”
(citation and quotations omitted)).
191
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
192
See James J. Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in American Employment Law, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 773, 773 (2011) (“In
the employment setting, however, the covenant has not fared nearly so well.”).
193
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07, Reporters’ Notes to Cmt. a (“Some courts do
not recognize the implied covenant in at-will employment or significantly limit its
scope.”); Brudney, supra note JJB1, at 773-74 (“The majority of states have declined to
apply Good Faith at all when reviewing disputes between employers and individual
employees.”).
194
See, e.g., Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., 837 A.2d 759, 768 (Conn. 2004)
(“Employment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any
reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability.”); Darrow v. Integris
Health, Inc., 176 P.3d 1204, 1210 (Okla. 2008) (“Employers are free to discharge at will
employees in good or bad faith, with or without cause.”); Morriss v. Coleman Company,
Inc., 241 Kan. 501, 518, 738 P.2d 841 (1987) (implied covenant “should not be applicable to
employment-at-will contracts”); Sanchez v. The New Mexican, 106 N.M. 76, 738 P.2d 1321,
1324 (1987) (“[T]here is no contract of employment upon which the law can impose the
stated duty to exercise good faith and fair dealing. Sanchez was an ‘at will’ employee who
190
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the express terms of the contract, the argument goes, then one cannot
impose an implied good-faith obligation that would impose some duty to
follow societal norms or “reasonable expectations.” 195 There was a general
intellectual effort, adopted to some extent in California, to use the duty of
good faith to weaken the at-will presumption and create something closer
to a “good cause” standard for termination.196 However, that movement
has gradually disappeared from the scholarship, and California rejected
good faith as a vehicle for undermining at-will.197
A number of jurisdictions, as well as the Restatement of
Employment Law, have carved out a limited role for good faith and fair
dealing in the employment context. The duty only applies when the
employer is proactively using its termination power (or other power) to
could be dismissed for any or no reason.”). See also Cramer v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 182
Ohio App. 3d 653, 663 (2009); Brozo v. Oracle Corp., 324 F.3d 661, 668 (8th Cir. 2003)
(applying Minnesota law); Miller v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 455 S.E.2d 799, 802 (W. Va.
1995); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983).
195
See Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380, 390 (Idaho 2005) (“[T]he covenant of
good faith and fair dealing does not alter the right to fire an at will employee; that is, the
covenant does not create good cause as a requirement.”). Cf. Brudney, supra note JJB1, at
775 (“It is not surprising that state courts are reluctant to impose norms of fairness on job
security arrangements when employers' residual authority to act in summary, arbitrary,
or malicious fashion toward their employees remains legislatively undisturbed.”).
196
See Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Ct. App. 1980) (“Termination of
employment without legal cause after such a period of time offends the implied-in-law
covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts, including employment
contracts. As a result of this covenant, a duty arose on the part of the employer, American
Airlines, to do nothing which would deprive plaintiff, the employee, of the benefits of the
employment bargain-benefits described in the complaint as having accrued during
plaintiff's 18 years of employment.); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816,
1836-37 (1980) (“By implying a duty to terminate only in good faith, courts can provide a
private remedy for wrongful discharge to replace the at will rule.”); see also Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927-28 (Ct. App. 1981) (discussing good faith but also
ultimately relying on implied contractual promise).
197
Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1112 (Cal. 2000) (“ To the extent Guz's implied
covenant [of good faith] cause of action seeks to impose limits on Bechtel's termination
rights beyond those to which the parties actually agreed, the claim is invalid.”); Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 398 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting a claim in tort for
violations of the duty of good faith on the grounds that “the employment relationship is
fundamentally contractual“).
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deprive the employee of some benefit that has already been earned under
the contract. So the duty is violated if the employer prevents the vesting
or accrual of an employee right or benefit; if the employer retaliates
against an employee because of an earned right or benefit; or if the
employer retaliates because the employee performed his or her obligations
under the employment contract itself or under the law.198 When it comes
to compensation and benefits that have been earned under the contract,
the employer is not permitted to use its termination power to pressure the
employee into foregoing them. For example, in Fortune v. Nat’l Cash
Register Co.,199 a salesman was fired soon after securing a big deal that
would have earned him a large bonus; the purpose of the termination was
to deprive him of that bonus. The court held that the employer violated
the duty of good faith by firing him to deprive him of the benefits of the
bonus structure.200 This definition of good faith fits well within the
historical ambit of the doctrine, as it goes beyond the explicit text of the
agreement to prevent one party from opportunistically acting to deprive
the other party of the benefit of the bargain.201 But it is also carefully
cabined to a limited set of specific circumstances.202 There must be an
198

RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT §§ 2.07(c), 3.05(c).
364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977).
200
Id. at 1258 (“Where the principal seeks to deprive the agent of all compensation by
terminating the contractual relationship when the agent is on the brink of successfully
completing the sale, the principal has acted in bad faith and the ensuing transaction
between the principal and the buyer is to be regarded as having been accomplished by the
agent.” (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 454 & cmt. a (1958))).
201
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07 (“[T]he employer's duty to cooperate means
that once an employee has substantially performed, unless there is independent cause for
termination, the employer cannot use its right to terminate without cause for the purpose
of depriving the employee of the benefit of the contract.”); Steven J. Burton, Breach of
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 387
(1980) (“Bad faith performance consists of an exercise of discretion in performance to
recapture opportunities forgone at formation.”); see also Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON.
233, 234 (1979) (discussing opportunism in the contractual context).
202
Cf. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07 cmt. b (arguing that “the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing serves as a supplementary aid in implementing the parties'
reasonable expectations and should not be read as a means of overriding the basic terms
of, or otherwise undermining the essential nature of, their contractual relationship”).
199
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effort by the employer to prevent the employee from receiving a specific
benefit that has already vested or been earned under the contract. This
generally-accepted definition of good faith in the employment context,
while offering well-justified protection, does not evidence the type of
mutual, fiduciary-based relationship to which this Article is pointing. It is
simply an employment version of the contractual duty of good faith.
This Article points to an employment relationship that goes beyond
contract and beyond good faith. Of course, good faith and fiduciary duties
are related: they are cousins, perhaps, or even siblings in the family tree of
legal doctrine.203 But as Gordon Smith has pointed out, “the scope of these
two doctrines is sufficiently different that they are not often viewed as
tackling related problems.”204 Most importantly, the duty of good faith is
contractual, while the fiduciary duties are relational.205 As this Article
argues below,206 the nature of the employment relationship is based in our
concept of the firm. It is the employee’s relationship with the firm that
separates the employment contract from those of independent contractors
that might also provide “work” for the employer.207 Independent
contractors are protected by a contractual duty of good faith. But
employees should have something more—something that reflects the
deeper relationship that employment provides. Rather than promoting a
version of the duty of good faith in the employment context that takes on
relational characteristics,208 the Article argues for the application of
relational duties, rather than simply contractual ones.
D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1399, 1487 (2002) (“Fiduciary duty and the duty of good faith and fair dealing are
variations on a theme.”).
204
Id. at 1488.
205
Id. (“While fiduciary duty is determined by the structure of the relationship, the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing emanates from the terms of the contract.”).
206
See part IV.C infra.
207
See Bodie, supra note MTB1.
208
For example, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the duty of good faith and fair dealing to
potentially require an employer to inform its employee about an upcoming merger.
Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (1987). The court held that “an avowedly
opportunistic discharge is a breach of contract” under the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. Id. at 438. In addition, the employee was a shareholder in the employer, which
was a closely held company, and the court held that “[c]lose corporations buying their
own stock, like knowledgeable insiders of closely held firms buying from outsiders, have
203
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B. Prior Theories of Employer Fiduciary Duties to Employees
Suggestions for the creation of employer fiduciary duties range
from specific, particularized duties to a broader set of responsibilities.
Those advocating for particular duties often point to a pre-existing
employer responsibility and build a fiduciary duty around that
responsibility. For example, Margaux Hall argued that employers act as
fiduciaries when they make health-care coverage decisions on behalf of
their employees as part of an employer-provided plan.209 Although many
employers have long provided health-care benefits to their employees, this
responsibility was heightened through the Affordable Care Act’s
“employer mandate.”210 Because employers are so integral to employees’
health care decisions, they play a unique rule in managing choices that go
to the core of employees’ personal and family lives. Hall proposed that
employers be considered employee “health fiduciaries” that make healthcare-related decisions in the interests of their employee-beneficiaries.211
a fiduciary duty to disclose material facts.” Id. at 435. For contrasting views on the import
of the court’s decision in Jordan, compare Marleen O’Connor, Restructuring the

Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1249-50 (1991) (arguing that Jordan created “an implied

fiduciary duty that the stock would not be bought back in an opportunistic fashion”) with
Deborah DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation , 1988 DUKE L. J.
879, 887 (“[T]he employer’s ability in Jordan to terminate the plaintiff’s employment and
thereby oblige him to sell his shares to the corporation is irrelevant to the employer’s
obligation, as fiduciary, to disclose information to the selling shareholder.”). See also
Aline van Bever, An Employer's Duty to Provide Information and Advice on Economic
Risks?, 42 INDUS. L.J. 1 (2013) (considering “whether the implied duty of trust and
confidence has developed so as to impose on the employer a duty to inform, advise and
warn his employees on economic risks”).
For a discussion of a strengthened duty of good faith as applied to employees, see
Jeffrey M. Judd, Note, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Examining
Employees' Good Faith Duties, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 483, 485 (1988) (arguing that “under
appropriate circumstances a court might find that an employee who abuses a special
position of trust and confidence is liable to his employer for tortious breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in his employment contract”).
209
Hall, supra note MH1, at 1737.
210
Id. at 1751-52.
211
Id. at 1759-65.
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Under this fiduciary relationship, employers would need to “(1) pursue
employees' sole interest in making discretionary coverage decisions; and
(2) refrain from acting in a self-interested manner.”212 Although the
specifics of these duties raise difficulties in hammering out, the creation of
a fiduciary relationship here “clarifies the underlying entitlements and
interests,” “helps bound otherwise unlimited discretion around formative
duties,” and “illuminates the deeper structural role that employers play in
this space.”213
Employers have also been targeted for obligations related to their
handling of private employee information. Scott Fast has argued that
employers should owe a duty of confidentiality to their employees similar
to that owed in other fiduciary relationships.214 Pointing to the sensitivity
of employee information on job performance, personal health, and
financial records, Fast argued that employers should be considered to have
a confidential relationship with their employees.215 Employers would be
liable for disclosing confidential employee information to third parties
under a tort theory similar to fiduciary duties.216 The Restatement of
Employment Law has adopted at least part of this approach by noting that
an employee has a protected privacy interest “in personal information
related to the employee that is provided in confidence to the employer.”217
The employer is liable in tort for providing such confidential information
to third parties without consent, if such disclosure is highly offensive.218
Progressive corporate law scholars have called for the imposition of
fiduciary duties on corporations that would run to corporate stakeholders

212
213

Id. at 1763.
Id. at 1768. See also Lauren R. Roth, The Collective Fiduciary, 94 NEB. L. REV. ___ (2016)

(discussing employer and insurer duties when deciding whether to grant health benefits
under health insurance plans).
214
Scott L. Fast, Breach of Employee Confidentiality: Moving Toward a Common-Law
Tort Remedy, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 433 (1993) (“[C]ourts could provide a common-law
remedy for disclosures to third parties in much the same way that they recognize the
confidentiality of physician-patient or attorney-client relationships.”).
215
Id. at 456-59.
216
217

Id.

RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.05(a) (2015).
218
Id. §§ 7.05(b) & 7.06.
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beyond shareholders. 219 In some instances, employees have been given a
special role amongst stakeholders. Some of these calls for fiduciary duties
to employees are designed to mirror similar existing duties from the
corporation to shareholders. Kent Greenfield has argued that “workers
should have some kind of representation on the board of directors or have
some role in electing directors, and that directors of companies should be
held to have some kind of fiduciary duties to workers in the employ of
their firm.”220 Greenfield has also advocated for a specific prohibition
against fraud in the context of the employment relationship, as a parallel
obligation to Rule 10b-5, which prohibits fraud in the context of the sale of
a security.221 The specific critique of existing policies behind these
proposals is that shareholders have been given specially protected status
within the corporation, and other stakeholders—especially employees—
deserve similar protections.
There have also been specific suggestions for limited extensions of
corporate fiduciary duties to employees in particular contexts. Marleen
O’Connor has proposed that corporate directors should owe a duty to
employees during fundamental corporate changes.222 Although flexibly
defined, the essence of the duty would require that “directors take the
actions that are necessary to compensate employees for their investments
in the corporation.”223 Drawing in part from corporate constituency
statutes, which gave directors the freedom to act on behalf of all corporate
stakeholders when making decisions as to transformative transactions, 224
219

For example, Margaret Blair has argued that boards of directors should take into
account the effects of their decisions on all of the corporation’s stakeholders, not just
shareholders. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 16 (1995).
220
Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 287
(1998).
221
Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor
Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715, 785-86 (1997) (proposing a model rule based on the text of Rule
10b-5).
222
O’Connor, supra note MOC1, at 1247-59.
223
Id. at 1253.
224
See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee
Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1232-36 (2004) (discussing arguments for and
against constituency statutes); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992).
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this duty would up the ante by making directors responsible to defend
employee interests during these transactions. O’Connor justified this duty
on the basis of employee “investments of time and human capital,” in
conjunction with their “trust and confidence” in directors to manage their
investments on their behalf.225 In particular, O’Connor believed that the
fiduciary duty “should include an obligation for the directors to safeguard
pension plan assets during hostile battles for control and internal
recapitalizations.”226 In a similar vein, Katherine Stone argued for
fiduciary duties that are owed to all stakeholders but would be enforceable
by employees.227 These duties would stem from corporate constituency
statutes and would protect employees “from major corporate restructuring
decisions that threaten to expropriate those investments.”228
These arguments for corporate director fiduciary duties to
employees all have in common a “stakeholder” model of the corporation.
They are contraposed to the “shareholder primacy” model of the
corporation, under which shareholders govern the company and should
have the sole right to enforce fiduciary duties against directors.229 At the
risk of giving short-shrift to this debate,230 it is more about the legal
O’Connor, supra note MOC1, at 1252.
Id. at 1254.
227
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders under State Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 48 (1991). See also Kent Greenfield, The
Third Way, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2014) (arguing that directors should owe their
fiduciary duties to the corporation as a whole, including all of its stakeholders).
228
Id. But see Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21
STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (1991) (arguing that “nonshareholder constituency statutes fail to
recognize that fiduciary duties are owed to residual claimants and residual claimants
alone because this is the group that faces the most severe set of contracting problems
with respect to defining the nature and extent of the obligations owed to them by officers
and directors”).
229
See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 211 (shareholder franchise); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
811 (Del. 1984) (“The derivative action developed in equity to enable shareholders to sue
in the corporation's name where those in control of the company refused to assert a claim
belonging to it.”).
230
Grant Hayden and I have engaged in this debate as well. Grant Hayden & Matthew T.
Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2071, 2120 (2010) (arguing for a “reexamination of the scope of the
corporate franchise” to include other stakeholders).
225
226
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structure of the corporation and of corporate governance than it is about
the relationship between employer and employee. Although a large
portion of employees are employed by public corporations, a large portion
are not.231 Developing a corporate director’s duty to employees does not
address whether similar duties would be owed by members of an LLC or
managing partners in a partnership—and if not, why not. Although
commentators have recognized this,232 they have not developed a
corresponding set of duties to employees within these other business
organizations. This paper takes a different approach. By discussing duties
owed by employers to employees, the particular type of business
organization becomes irrelevant to the analysis.233 And the duties owed by
the employer stem specifically from the employer-employee
relationship—not from the mix of participants in a particular type of
business enterprise.

C. Employers as Fiduciaries under Agency & Fiduciary Theory
The traditional debate over the fiduciary nature of employment has
focused on employees—specifically, employees as agents. Employees are
fiduciaries because they are a subspecies of agents. The theory behind
agents as fiduciaries is relatively simple. Characterized as falling within
one of the “core” categories of fiduciary relationship,234 agents have power
over the interests of their principals and are empowered to act on behalf of
the principals. Agents have discretion in carrying out their responsibilities
as agents. This discretion requires contracts that are sufficiently

Andrew Lundeen & Kyle Pomerleau, Corporations Make Up 5 Percent of Businesses
but Earn 62 Percent of Revenues, TAX POLICY BLOG, Nov. 25, 2014, at:

231

http://taxfoundation.org/blog/corporations-make-5-percent-businesses-earn-62-percentrevenues.
232
Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 317 n.161 (“While the focus of this Article is on
corporations, this argument from the relational basis of fiduciary duty might conceivably
be extended to all employer/employee relationships, even when the employer is not a
corporation.”).
233
As discussed in Part V, however, the governance of that organization is relevant—
particularly the degree to which employees participate in that governance.
234
Miller, supra PMFR, at 76, 79-80.
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incomplete to require fiduciary duties.235 Employees are agents because
they similarly have discretion over the interests of the employer, and they
receive delegated authority to act in the interests of the employer.236
But this analysis is missing half of the equation. Both employees
and the employer have a set of mutual interests that differentiate
employment from other contractual relationships. And that relationship
gives both employees and employer discretion over aspects of the
relationship that allow for opportunism. For these reasons, the employer
should also be considered to be a fiduciary for its employees. As discussed
further below, the employer—as legal entity, and as aggregate of the
individuals who make up the employer—has relational responsibilities in
the vein of fiduciary duties. It therefore makes sense to characterize the
employment relationship as a whole as fiduciary, and the employer as a
fiduciary of its employees.
There are several approaches in fiduciary theory for determining
whether a relationship should be characterized as fiduciary in nature.
Many courts follow a status-based approach in which the relationship is
fiduciary if it has historically been categorized as such.237 As a theoretical
matter, this approach is fairly unsatisfying, as it is based on history and
only recognizes new categories (if any) by a purely analogical method.238
But there is support for a status-based approach to employment as a
fiduciary relationship. Employees, of course, have traditionally been
treated as fiduciaries. And as discussed in Part III, employers have
gradually accreted a plethora of statutory, regulatory, and even commonlaw responsibilities for their employees that are fiduciary in substance.
Thus, it is not too radical to envision the employment relationship as a
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF1, at 427 (“[A] ‘fiduciary’ relation is a
contractual one characterized by unusually high costs of specification and monitoring.”).
236
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 429 cmt. a (1958) (“The principles determining
the servant's duties to the principal are the same as those in regard to other agents . . . .”).
237
Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the Workplace, 100
CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2015) (“Most fiduciary relationships are treated as such as a
matter of status or convention.” (quotations omitted)); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of
Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 241-43 (2011) (stating that courts determine
“whether the category is conventionally recognized as fiduciary”).
238
Id. (“[N]ew categories of relationship are recognized as fiduciary simply by virtue of
having been found sufficiently similar to a paradigmatic category . . . .”).
235
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mutual fiduciary relationship, even if employers have not traditionally
been treated as fiduciaries.
Other courts have shunned a categorical or status-based approach
and instead treated each particular relationship at issue as potentially
fiduciary under a fact-based approach.239 The indicia of fiduciary status
vary from court to court. Common-law courts have at various times
looked at the following factors: the ability of the fiduciary to exercise
discretion in carrying out its tasks;240 the vulnerability of the beneficiary to
the fiduciary’s exercise of power and potential opportunism;241 the trust
and confidence reposed in the fiduciary by the beneficiary;242 and
reasonable expectations of the parties.243 These factors all support specific
theories of fiduciary responsibility, which will be discussed in more depth
below.
Many of the most prominent fiduciary theorists place the primary
emphasis on discretion. Paul Miller has defined the fiduciary relationship
as “one in which one party (the fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power over
the significant practical interests of another (the beneficiary).”244 Gordon
Smith has stated that: “fiduciary relationships form when one party (the
‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while
239
240

Id. at 243-47.

Zastrow v. Journal Commc'ns, Inc., 718 N.W.2d 51, 59 (Wis. 2006) (“A consistent facet of
a fiduciary duty is the constraint on the fiduciary's discretion to act in his own self-interest
because by accepting the obligation of a fiduciary he consciously sets another's interests
before his own.”).
241
Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The common law imposes that
[fiduciary] duty when the disparity between the parties in knowledge or power relevant to
the performance of an undertaking is so vast that it is a reasonable inference that had the
parties in advance negotiated expressly over the issue they would have agreed that the
agent owed the principal the high duty that we have described, because otherwise the
principal would be placing himself at the agent's mercy.”).
242
Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (inquiring as to
whether one party “reposed confidence in another and reasonably relied on the other’s
superior expertise and knowledge”).
243
DeMott, supra note DDM-Cornell, at 1261 (finding that “courts impose ad hoc or factbased fiduciary duties when although the parties' relationship was not categorically
fiduciary, its characteristics nonetheless justified one party's expectation of loyal conduct
from the other”).
244
Id. at 262 (italics omitted); see also Miller, supra note PMFR, at 69.
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exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the
beneficiary.”245 And Larry Ribstein has argued that fiduciary duties should
apply “where an ‘owner’ who controls and derives the residual benefit from
property delegates open-ended management power over property to a
‘manager.’”246 The notion of discretion as critical to fiduciary relationships
forms the cornerstone of many fiduciary theories.
The employment relationship fits this paradigm. An employee is a
fiduciary of the employer because the employee exercises discretion in
carrying out the duties of employment.247 However, an employer also
exercises discretion over the employees’ practical interests and critical
resources. The employer—the legal entity that employs the employees—
controls the employees’ employment as well as the fruits of the employees’
labor. The joint production accomplished by employees working together
with the capital provided by equity contributors is what constitutes the
firm.248 And the controllers of the firm have a fiduciary responsibility to
employees over the management of that joint production. Thus, the
employees’ significant practical interests include: the terms and conditions
of their employment,249 the structure of employment, the opportunities for
D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1399, 1402 (2002). See also D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary Discretion, 75
OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 644 (2014) (“The most commonly cited scholarly works in the canon of
fiduciary law emphasize the importance of discretion in fiduciary relationships.”).
246
Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 215. See also Larry
E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 901 (2011) (“[M]y definition [of
fiduciary relationships] focuses on the particular type of entrustment that arises from a
property owner's delegation to a manager of open-ended management power over
property without corresponding economic rights.”).
247
However, the amount of discretion afforded to an individual employee may vary
widely based on the circumstances. Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract,
8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 154 (2005) (“Most employment relationships permit the
employee at least some discretion in performing tasks.”); DeMott, supra note DDMCornell, at 1256 (“[A]lthough a firm's employees share a common employer, the nature of
their work spans a broad spectrum, ranging from responsibilities that necessarily involve
exercising substantial discretion to closely monitored and highly specified tasks.”).
248
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note AD1, at 794 (defining the firm to include “joint input
production” and “several input owners”).
249
Terms and conditions include not only wages, but also short-term and long-term
benefits such as the health-care coverage. See Hall, supra note MH1 (discussing
employer control over health care).
245
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promotion or termination, the distribution of responsibilities within the
employer, and the distribution of resources within the employer. In terms
of a “critical resource,” the employer controls the critical resource of the
employer’s ongoing business.250 Employees cannot individually take that
business and operate it for themselves; the employer controls the business
as well as the relationships, contracts, property, intellectual property,
goodwill, and other legal aspects of the business.251 The employer
exercises its discretion in making business decisions on behalf of those
who participate in the business—namely, the equity investors and the
labor contributors (employees). The employer’s ongoing business is
clearly a critical resource for employees. Even Ribstein’s notion of
property ownership would apply if we use the Alchian and Demsetz model
of the firm that includes all firm inputs, such as capital and labor, as part
of the firm’s property interests.252
A foreseeable objection to this approach is to argue that employees
are not the beneficiaries of the employer with respect to the business
enterprise. Instead, the owners of the employer (in whatever organization
form it takes) are the beneficiaries. Thus, in a corporation, shareholders
would arguably be the beneficiaries of the corporation’s exercise of its
discretion over the critical resource of the corporation’s business.253
However, while shareholders have an interest in the employercorporation’s business, employees are also beneficiaries who are interested
in that business. Shareholders are not traditional “owners” of the
corporations in many respects; they at best have an ownership interest in a

Bainbridge, supra note SB-PM, at 661 (making the assumption for his model that
“managers have substantial experience in running large organizations and, accordingly,
are properly vested with almost unfettered discretion”).
251
Cf. Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 376 (2009) (“As in the case of the closely held mark, trademark
law may serve to partition the reputational investment of the firm from that of the rank
and file employee.”).
252
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note AD1, at 794.
253
This distinction matters more to Smith’s formulation, which requires that the critical
resource “belong” to the beneficiary, Smith, supra note GS-CRT, at 1402, whereas Miller’s
formulation requires only that the beneficiaries’ significant practical interests are at stake.
Miller, supra note PMFR, at 69.
250
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sliver of the corporation’s designated profits.254 While shareholders are
clearly invested in the corporation and its business, employees are also
invested. Shareholders’ funds may be uniquely vulnerable, and their
returns are more contingent and less defined that those provided to
employees.255 However, the average employee arguably has more invested
in the business enterprise that the average shareholder.256 Workers have
invested their ongoing time and labor in the enterprise; they may also
invest their careers and their vocational aspirations, as well as their

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm:
A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1428 (1993) (“The old [private
254

property] model depended upon the corporation being a thing capable of being owned . . .
. As we have seen, however, nexus of contracts theory squarely rejects this basic
proposition.”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2002) (“From both a legal and an economic perspective, the
claim that shareholders own the public corporation simply is empirically incorrect.”).
Moreover, employees need not be owners in order to have a claim to the critical resource.
As Smith has elaborated:
Whether the existence of a particular thing justifies the imposition of
fiduciary duties, therefore, depends on whether that thing provides the
fiduciary with the occasion to act opportunistically. And whether that
thing provides the fiduciary with the occasion to act opportunistically will
depend in large part on whether society has made a normative decision
that the thing belongs to the beneficiary. This decision is exogenous to
the critical resource theory.
Smith, supra note GS-CRT, at 1444.
255
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 67-70, 91 (1991).
256
As Kent Greenfield notes:
Most shareholders of public corporations have little in the way of a
genuine relationship with the companies in which they hold stock, other
than as arms-length investors. A typical shareholder may have a
significant amount of turnover in her portfolio in any given year.
Workers, by contrast, have a close connection to the firm that employs
them and may hold their jobs for years.
Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 317-18.
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personal character and identity.257 They invest in firm-specific capital that
by definition is not alienable, unlike most stock investments.258 Along with
the equity investors, they are the co-participants in the economic life of the
firm.259
Vulnerability is also a critical feature of fiduciary relationships. The
beneficiary is vulnerable to the power/discretion of the fiduciary, which is
what calls down fiduciary duties on the exercise of this power.260 If the
beneficiary were able to protect itself through contract or other legal
protection, it would not need the fiduciary duty. However, the openendedness of the relationship subjects the beneficiary to the fiduciary’s
potential opportunism.261 Vulnerability is often characterized as
dependency: the beneficiary is dependent on the fiduciary’s discretion or
good graces to get what they need or deserve.262 This link between
power/discretion and vulnerability/dependency is a critical justification for
the fiduciary relationship.263
See Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV.
1179, 1184-85 (2010) (“The most effective branding programs secure a competitive
advantage for the branded business by generating a sense of community and belonging
that induces extraordinary effort and productivity on the job, furthers cohesion even
among an increasingly diverse workforce, minimizes the need for surveillance and close
supervision, and reduces employee turnover.”).
258
Bainbridge, supra SB-PM, at 1049 (describing the conditions under which employees
will invest in firm-specific capital).
259
Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 299 (“What is important at this juncture is to notice
that workers have some of the same problems as shareholders: they contribute something
of value to management and they must depend on management both to maximize the
return on that input and to share that return with them.”).
260
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW 185, 190 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (“Fiduciary relationships are,
characteristically, relationships of power and dependency.”).
261
Smith & Lee, supra note S&L, at 620 (“Although incomplete contracts are inevitable,
contracting parties routinely create fiduciary relationships, in which one party (the
beneficiary) seems especially vulnerable to opportunism by the counterparty (the
fiduciary).”).
262
Miller, supra note PM-TFL, at 254 (“Dependence is usually taken to mean that certain
interests of the beneficiary are subject to influence by the fiduciary.”).
263
See id. at 620 n.54; Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular
Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 470 (2010) (“[A]ll beneficiaries
are vulnerable to the fiduciary's abuse of legally entrusted administrative power over
257
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Critics of employee fiduciary duties point to this factor to
emphasize the inapplicability of such duties to employees. The employer
is not vulnerable to its employees, they argue; if anything employees are
vulnerable to and dependent on their employers.264 The first claim is
perhaps overstated: the employer is vulnerable to employee opportunism
as a result of the discretion afforded to those employees.265 But employees
are unquestionably vulnerable to their employers with respect to their
livelihoods and their connection to the ongoing business enterprise.266 For
at-will employees, their investments in their career and in the employer’s
business can vanish in an instant.267 Employees are vulnerable to the
employer’s control over the business enterprise to steer a greater share of
the firm’s profits back to equity owners and away from employees.268
Similarly, employees must place trust and confidence in their employers
on a variety of levels to look out for their interests and manage the joint
enterprise in which they participate; they trust that the employer (and
those who run it) will utilize their labor with care and competence to

their legal and practical interests.”); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal
Authority, 31 QUEENS L.J. 259, 275 (2005)(asserting that a fiduciary obligation arises
“whenever one party unilaterally assumes discretionary power of an administrative nature
over the important interests of another, interests that are especially vulnerable to the
fiduciary's discretion”)).
264
See Fisk & Barry, supra note FB1, at 419 (“The employer owes no duty of loyalty to the
employee and is free to pursue its self-interest by firing him to hire another for a lower
wage or for better skills. Yet the employee's ability to pursue her own self-interest by
seeking better opportunities is limited [under a duty of loyalty].”).
265
See, e.g., Andrew Frazier, The Employee’s Contractual Duty of Fidelity, 131 L.Q. REV.
53, 54 (2015) (discussing opportunities for employee opportunism).
266
FRANK TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (“We have become a nation of employees.
We are dependent upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have
become completely dependent upon wages. . . . For our generation the substance of life is in
another man's hands.”).
267
Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 302 (noting that firm-specific skills “make a worker
more valuable to her present employer, but also make her more vulnerable to a firm's
opportunistic behavior”).
268
See Greg Dow & Louis Putterman, Why Capital (Usually) Hires Labor: An Assessment
of Proposed Explanations, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 17, 37 (Margaret M.
Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (“[I]t is unclear why equity investors have a greater need
for safeguards against managerial abuse than employees.”).
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create a successful business.269 Thus, the vulnerability factor weighs in
favor of the employer as fiduciary.
Under a more specifically contractual approach to the fiduciary
relationship, the parties’ reasonable expectations justify fiduciary duties.270
Because contracts in certain types of relationships are substantially
incomplete,271 there is a need for a gap-filler to manage the
incompleteness in a flexible way. The fiduciary duty should thus be based
on the parties’ reasonable expectations—an off-the-rack legal form, like
the corporation, that best suits the underlying interests of the parties
involved. Employees are assigned fiduciary duties under this theory
because the employer cannot dictate every aspect of the job in the contract.
Because the employee is charged with managing the employer’s business,
the employer and employee would want the employee to act in the
interests in the employer in carrying on the business. However, the
problem of opportunism within incomplete contracts is one that
employees confront vis-à-vis employers as well. Employers make myriad
decisions that affect employees—both those that directly involve
employees (like decisions to hire or fire) and those that indirectly but
significantly affect employees (like the decision to start a new product
line). These decisions cannot be reduced to specific contractual provisions
at the outset of the relationship.272 Given the resulting incompleteness,

Bainbridge, supra note SB-PM, at 666 (“Both the livelihood and much of the wealth of
employees is thus dependent on the firm’s survival.”).
270
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF1, at 427 (“The duty of loyalty replaces detailed
contractual terms, and courts flesh out the duty of loyalty by prescribing the actions the
parties themselves would have preferred if bargaining were cheap and all promises fully
enforced.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 900 (2011)
(“[T]he fiduciary duty is most usefully viewed as a type of contract.”).
271
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF1, at 426 (“[T]he duty of loyalty is a response to the
impossibility of writing contracts completely specifying the parties' obligations.”)
272
Bainbridge, supra note SB-PM, at 664 (“Because employees and employers cannot
execute a complete contract under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, many
decisions must be left for later contractual rewrites imposed by employer fiat.”);
Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 317 (“Workers and management thus face significant
barriers to contracting, in that they face huge transaction costs in reducing to writing all
the implicit understandings necessary to reach the outcome best for both parties.”).
269
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fiduciary duties are justified to balance out the expectations of the
parties.273
The economic justification for the fiduciary law of agency is the
reduction of agency costs—the costs that a principal must incur in
monitoring an agent. In the simple framework of principal-agent or
master-servant, the one-person principal/beneficiary clearly must expend
monitoring costs on the agent/fiduciary, some of which are mitigated by
the fiduciary duty. However, employees also incur agency costs in making
sure that the employer abides by its promises as to pay and benefits,
allocates the responsibilities for the enterprise fairly, and allocates the
returns to the business equitably.274 As to the latter, the employer may
favor equity investors over employees,275 may favor one group of
employees over another, or may unfairly deprive one employee of
reasonable compensation.276 Individual employees generally have no way
273

Judge Easterbrook himself penned an opinion which gave potential protections to
employees against employer opportunism that was effectuated by withholding
confidential information. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (1987). Although
this opinion was based on the duty of good faith, it nevertheless showed the depth of the
relationship between employer and employee, and the concern for employer
opportunism. Id. at 438 (“Employment creates occasions for opportunism.”).
274
Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 299 (“Employees in a firm, in fact, must bear certain
monitoring costs—‘agency costs’—associated with making sure that the firm's
management is keeping their interests at heart.”).
275
Id. (“What is important at this juncture is to notice that workers have some of the same
problems as shareholders: they contribute something of value to management and they
must depend on management both to maximize the return on that input and to share that
return with them.”).
276
Lilly Ledbetter provides one example of the need for monitoring costs. Ledbetter spent
nineteen years as a manager and executive at Goodyear Tire & Rubber and assumed that
she was being paid a fair income. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,
621 (2007); id. at 643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). At the end of her tenure, however, she
discovered (through an anonymous office note) that male employees in similar positions
were making significantly more money than she was. Transcript at DNC Convention, at:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics-july-dec08-ledbetter_08-26/. By the time she
retired, Ledbetter was paid $3,727 per month; the lowest paid male area manager received
$4,286 per month, the highest paid, $5,236. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 643 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Ledbetter sued for sex discrimination under the Title VII. Her lawsuit was
originally found to be time-barred but ultimately led Congress to change the Statute of
Limitations to allow for suits like hers. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
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of monitoring these decisions, other than through their own personal
experience and what evidence they can glean from other employees.277
Employees have no right to see each other’s pay, and social norms
generally prevent the free spread of such information.278
Unions address these vulnerabilities in certain respects: they can
represent a group of employees, bargain in good faith with the employer,
and require that the employer disclose the employees’ terms and
conditions of employment.279 But unions can only insist on bargaining;
they cannot provide any legal remedies for opportunism that is not
otherwise prohibited by law. Although often treated as a panacea in
incomplete-contracting literature,280 labor unions fail to play the same role
that fiduciary duties would. Moreover, less than seven percent of privatesector employees are represented by unions.281
The steady decline in unionism has had an important cost to the
role of employees in governance. Unions provide a vehicle for workers to
participate in the governance of the employer. By choosing a collective

111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). However, Ledbetter would never have known to bring a suit if it
were not the secret informant.
277
Even a duty of care would be important to employees, as their human-capital
investments in the firm will only pay off if management does not manage the business
poorly. Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 300 (“Like shareholders, workers depend on the
care, skill and good faith of the management. If the managers do not take care, or are
stupid, or look after themselves only, both the shareholders and the workers will be
harmed.”).
278
See Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Pay Secrecy/Confidentiality Rules and the
National Labor Relations Act, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121 (2003); Leonard Bierman &
Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”: Workplace Social Norms and
the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167 (2004); Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and
Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 41, 62 (2005).
279
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (duty to bargain in good faith); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149 (1956) (requiring an employer to provide information to union to substantiate
bargaining claims).
280
See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford & Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 315-16
(1978) (describing how unions can stifle employer opportunism).
281
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Press Release, Union Members Summary, Jan. 28, 2016,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
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representative, workers can have a voice in the affairs of the workplace.282
But workers should not be dependent on unions for such a voice; instead,
they should be incorporated into the governance mechanisms of the firm.
If they left outside the firm governance structure, they are vulnerable to
the firm’s decisionmakers in ways that make them less like fidicuaries and
more like beneficiaries.
Part V will describe the fiduciary relationship between employees
under two very different models. The first model represents the current
economic reality: employees work for an employer in which they have no
participation in governance or ownership. The second model represents a
potential for the future: employees participate in governance and
ownership along with the other equity investors in the firm. The
differences between these models of governance result in two very
different paradigms for the fiduciary relationship.

V.

EMPLOYER DUTIES AND EMPLOYER GOVERNANCE

The employment relationship is best conceived as a mutual set of
fiduciary relationships between employer and employee. Employees owe
fiduciary duties of loyalty and performance to the employer, and the
employer owes such duties to its employees. However, the nature and
scope of these relationships will differ depending on the nature of the
relationship.
The critical factor, from a fiduciary perspective, should be whether
employees participate in the governance of the firm/employer. If they do
not, as is common at most American workplaces, the employer will owe
stronger fiduciary duties to employees in order to address the employer’s
untrammeled discretion (vis-à-vis employees) and the potential for
opportunism. However, if employees do participate in the governance of
their employer, the employer will be less akin to a remote fiduciary and
more akin to a participatory democracy. The firm will be the mechanism
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A
Call for Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 804 (2011) (“The organization of

282

workers in unions was also viewed as beneficial because it would give them a greater say
in the running of the workplace, and perhaps the country.”).
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of coordinating joint production, through which employees and equity
investors manage the business together. In such a relationship, employees
will have duties to themselves and other participants akin to the duties that
partners owe to one another. There is less need for fiduciary duties and
the concomitant oversight they provide if employees are represented
within the “firm” itself.

A. Employer Fiduciary Duties Without Employee Participation in
Governance
Employees share many of the characteristics of beneficiaries in
fiduciary relationships: the employer exercises discretion in the
management of the firm; employees are vulnerable to the use of that
discretion and the potential for opportunism; and employees must incur
agency costs in managing their relationship with the employer.283 In that
discussion, we bracketed the idea of the “employer,” allowing the term to
perhaps slip into the personification called to mind by “master-servant”
doctrine. But the employer is a firm. It is a group of people working
together in a joint business enterprise. Like a partnership, it is an entity
and an aggregate—a fictional person representing the interests of the
collective. Employees participate in the business of the firm—but do they
participate in its governance?
In most cases, they do not. Employees are not a meaningful
category when it comes to corporate law.284 They are simply one category
of the many parties who form contracts with the corporation. Although
individual states have their own separate sets of corporate law, states
uniformly delineate the roles of directors, officers, and shareholders in
governing the entity. The relationships between these three groups
constitute the purpose and function of corporate law.285 Shareholders

See Part IV.C supra.
Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds.,
2012).
285
See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 93-140 (1986) (discussing distribution of
power between shareholders, directors, and officers).
283
284
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select the directors at the annual shareholders meeting.286 The board
manages the firm and may bind the corporation through contracts and
transfers of property.287 Directors are bound to act in the interests of the
firm through common law fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty.
Officers are the titular heads of the corporate hierarchy, with authority to
manage the company until the board replaces them.288 This structure—
shareholders select the directors, who select the officers, who in turn run
the corporation—is the internal engine of corporate governance.
Employees are not included.
Corporations are not alone in their exclusion of employees. An
employee may in some cases be characterized as a partner if she is part of
a group that meets the partnership definition: “an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”289 But
employees-as-employees are excluded from partnership governance, which
is controlled by partners, either as a whole or a designated sub-group.290
Limited partnerships and LLPs are managed by general partners,291 and
LLCs have a flexible governance structure but one that defaults to
governance by its “members.”292 Members are designated within the LLC,
and membership does not extend to employees as a category.
As the above should make clear, United States business
organizational law has been remarkably successful in separating
employment from ownership.293 Under our current system, employees
286

DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 211.
Id. § 141.
288
See CLARK, supra note RCC, at 113-23 (discussing the powers and duties of officers).
289
R.U.P.A. § 101(6) (1994); see, e.g., Holmes v. Lerner, 74 Cal. App. 4th 442, 457-58 (1999)
(finding that a partnership was created informally, without a governing document, when
parties agreed to build business together and share profits).
290
R.U.P.A. § 401(f) (1994); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCORPORATED
BUSINESS ENTITIES 431 (4th ed. 2009) (“A hallmark of the partnership form is the co-equal
right of every partner, absent a contrary agreement, to participate in the management of
the enterprise.”).
291
REV. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 403 (1976); cf. RIBSTEIN & LIPSHAW, supra note R&L, at 529
(noting that LLPs may prefer centralized partnership management).
292
Id. at 432 (“Most LLC statutes provide that, in the absence of a contrary agreement, the
LLC is managed directly by members.”).
293
See Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate
Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003) (exploring “how, in the course of the twentieth
287
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hand over their labor, good will, and personal capital to the firm, but then
the firm – established as a corporation, partnership, or LLC – directs those
assets to the ultimate benefit of the governance participants, which are
generally equity investors. “Shareholder primacy” in corporate law is the
most familiar instantiation of these mechanics. The justification for
shareholder primacy generally proceeds as follows: because shareholders
are the most vulnerable, they are given control over governance rights,
including voting rights and the ability to seek redress for violations of
fiduciary duties.294 The end result is that all other stakeholders, including
employees, are fenced out from participation in governance.295
If employees as a category are excluded from governance, they
have no way to address the employer’s discretion, their own vulnerability
to that discretion, and the opportunism and agency costs that are inherent
in the relationship. Because of this, the employer as legal entity must
assume stronger fiduciary duties to address the imbalance. Essentially, the
employer would have a duty not to use its discretion to take undue
advantage of employees, either individually or as a group. 296 This duty
would be placed on all employers, regardless of their underlying business
organizational form. The fiduciary duty would be an effort at boundary
enforcement, closing off a narrow but important range of discretion that
would otherwise be open to employers.297 In their words, the duty would
“distinguish the appropriate pursuit of self-interest from the inappropriate
century, legal scholars and political theorists helped remove the interests of workers (as
differentiated from shareholders, officers, and directors) from the core concerns of
corporate law and theory”).
294
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF-Book, at 67-70, 90-93.
295
For an employee-centric attack on shareholder primacy, see Brett H. McDonnell,
Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 334, 335 (2008) (arguing instead for employee primacy in corporate decisionmaking). Cf. David I. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-In and the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1429 (2012) (arguing that certain consumers have long-term and locked-in
interests that should give them certain governance rights).
296
Robert Bird proposed that employment contracts have an “implied covenant of the
employment relation” that would address some of the relational opportunism concerns
discussed here. Bird, supra note RCB1, at 200 (“Thus, a covenant of the employment
relation would be satisfied if the employer did not engage in relational opportunism
towards its employees.”).
297
Smith & Lee, supra note S&L, at 635.

EMPLOYMENT AS FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

62

pursuit of self-interest.”298 Here, self-interest would be the firm’s pursuit of
its individual interests and the interests of its owners/controllers at the
expense of employees’ interests.
This robust-sounding fiduciary duty may scare traditionalists, who
might see the corporate world turned upside-down. But this duty
complements, rather than replaces, the rule of shareholder primacy, and
would in fact apply to every employer, no matter the businessorganizational form. The rule would sit within the existing common-law
and statutory protections for employees that, in fact, treat the employer as
something of a fiduciary already. Many of the labor and employment
protections discussed above in Part III are responses to employer
opportunism.299 Minimum wages protect against employers using their
market power to force substandard remuneration on employees—
remuneration less than what we deem to be societally acceptable for labor.
Required benefits such as family and medical leave or health-insurance
coverage force the employer to provide basic level of care for all
employees. Fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA prohibit an employer
from underfunding a plan or succumbing to a conflict of interest.
Employers cannot subject their employees to unsafe workplaces and must
bear responsibility for injuries that workers suffer in the scope of
employment. The common law has also restrained employer discretion:
covenants not to compete are subject to a reasonableness test, and
terminations cannot be carried out in bad faith or in retaliation for
protected conduct. Perhaps the most meaningful set of quasi-fiduciary or
governance rights are the employees’ rights to choose a bargaining
representative and require the employer to bargain in good faith. The
bargaining representative can fight employer opportunism against
employees by collecting information about employees and their terms and
conditions of employment, forcing the employer to justify those terms and
conditions through a process of negotiation, providing rights for
employees to work together and even strike, if they feel they are not
298

299

Id. (emphasis in original).
Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225,

273 (2013) (arguing that “employment law can be profitably understood as serving the
interest in promoting social equality and that its rules can be analyzed, defended, and
critiqued based on the degree to which they advance that interest”).
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getting treated properly, and establishing a grievance-arbitration system
for the resolution of individual employee concerns about mistreatment or
opportunism.300 But whatever their strengths, these labor and employment
protections do not obviate the need for a common-law fiduciary duties
toward employees. Instead, they provide further evidence for the concerns
underlying such duties as well as support for a fiduciary approach.
So what would change? Starting incrementally, an employer
fiduciary duty would look similar to the existing duty of good faith, such
that the employer could not fire an employee to prevent the accrual of a
bonus or could not conceal business information to mislead an
employee.301 Expanding this outward, courts could develop norms—based
both on industry standards and social policy—about what sorts of conduct
unfairly take advantage of employees and reek of opportunism.302 In
addition, employers would take on a duty to act in the interests of
employees when making decisions regarding employee interests, such as
pension and health insurance plans.303 Pursued even more aggressively,
employer fiduciary duties could be used to examine the structure of the
employment relationship and compare the relative returns to employees
and the employer. It is conceivable that an employer using its contractual
power to extract huge rents from its business enterprise while sharing only
paltry amounts with employees could be subject to the duty against
opportunistic behavior.304 Finally, perhaps the employer’s fiduciary duty
300
301
302

See Part III.A.6 supra.
See Part IV.A supra (discussing RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 2.07, 3.05 (2015)).

In their discussion of fiduciary duties, Smith and Lee place an emphasis on the role of
social norms and industry customs in developing these duties. However, they also
recognize that “”some industry customs and social norms may be undesirable from a
societal standpoint.” Smith & Lee, supra note S&L, at 638.
303
Margaux Hall’s argument for specific fiduciary duties in the context of health
insurance coverage provides a nice application of this principle. Hall, supra note MH1.
304
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is the largest private employer in the United States. Lesley
Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 95, 95 (2011). It has often been cited in
the legal and economic literature for its relatively paltry wages and benefits, as compared
with the returns distributed to its shareholders—members of the Walton family. See, e.g.,
id. at 97 (noting “Wal-Mart's quasi-monopsonistic hiring power [and] its vigorous unionbusting efforts”); Benedict Sheehy, Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case
Study, 24 J.L. & COM. 1, 40 (2004) (“Wal-Mart's low wage policy drives down prices in the
labour market. It off loads its operating costs onto the state and other businesses. It
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could include a prohibition against subcontracting, restructuring, or other
forms of workplace “fissuring” in which employees are cut loose from the
firm and cut out of their share of the pie.305
It may seem objectionable to saddle the employer with such a
significant and potentially ambiguous responsibility for the interests of its
employees, who (under current law) are deemed contractual partners
looking after themselves. But this contractual model of the employment
relationship is outdated, and it is blind to the many common-law and
statutory responsibilities that society has already loaded upon employers,
starting with the original doctrine of respondeat superior. We may also
object to the paternalistic way in which we expect the business to look out
for the interests of its workers—a “nanny employer,” as it were.306 There is
a way out of this paradigm—a way in which employees depend less on the
employer as a separate entity and take more responsibilities upon
themselves. But this would require giving employees meaningful
governance rights within the employer itself.

B. Employer Fiduciary Duties under a Participatory Governance Model
If employees participate in the governance of the employer, the
fiduciary relationship changes. No longer are workers simply subject to
damages the well-being of employees by eliminating opportunity to access psychic
income generating activities, and increasing stress resulting from employee turn-over.”);
Carol Zabin et al., The Hidden Public Costs of Low-Wage Jobs in California, The National
Economic Development and Law Center, at 23-25 (May 2004)
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2004/workingpoor.pdf; Edward B. Shils, Measuring the

Economic and Sociological Impact of the Mega-Retail Discount Chains on Small
Enterprise in Urban, Suburban and Rural Communities, SHILS REP., Feb. 7, 1997. But see
Richard A. Epstein, On Wal-Mart: Doing Good by Doing Nothing, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1287,

1304 (2007) (“Wal-Mart is the source of opportunity. Its opponents block opportunities.
They do not create them.”).
For a discussion of a company that allegedly broke its relational promises to
employees, see Judy Pate & Charles Malone, Post-“Psychological Contract” Violation: The
Durability and Transferability of Employee Perceptions: The Case of TimTec, 24 J. EUR.
INDUS. TRAINING 158 (2000).
305
For a discussion of new ways in which employees are sliced, diced, and minced out of
the modern firm, see DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014).
306
M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517 (2009).
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the whims of a separate entity that controls the underlying business
enterprise. Instead, they have a voice in the decisionmaking mechanisms
of that enterprise. They have a role to play in the employer’s exercise of its
discretion. They are no longer as vulnerable to opportunism. Their
vulnerability is that of one set of participants to another, rather than of a
powerless beneficiary and a powerful fiduciary. It becomes less a question
of fiduciary responsibility and more one of appropriately structured
governance rights. Instead, it is about the use of fiduciary duties to
manage the discretion and vulnerabilities within the employment
relationship. And such duties could be changed—diminished—if
employees had participatory rights in firm governance.307
As participants in the firm, employees would no longer be able to
view the “employer” as simply an us-against-them relationship. Instead,
the employer would consist of the employees as well as the equity
investors. As such, employees would have duties to each other and to the
other participants through their own fiduciary duties to the employer.
This approach provides a much stronger foundation for the traditional
employee fiduciary duties to the firm. The employees as a group are
committing to refrain from opportunism that would harm their fellow
employees. An employee would not be harming a nameless, faceless
“employer” by stealing business opportunities or disclosing confidential
information. Instead, the employee would be harming the ongoing
business enterprise, represented by the firm, in which his fellow employees
were still participating. So instead of being tribute paid to a master, the
duty of loyalty is a pact amongst equals not to engage in opportunism.
Similarly, intellectual property doctrines that seem to harm employees,
like the shop-right doctrine308 or the work-for hire doctrine,309 could be
307

An extensive discussion of employee participation in management is beyond the scope
of this paper. However, such an approach would be more consonant with employees’
participatory role within the firm. See Bodie, supra note MTB-EBF, at 100, 102. For an
argument that participatory management may be an adaptive market response but
should not be made mandatory, see Bainbridge, supra note SB-PM, at 658. For arguments
in favor of worker participation, see Greenfield, supra note KG-PW. For an argument that
employee participation in governance only works when workers are homogenous, see
HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 91-98 (1996).
308
CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF
CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-1930 118 (2009).
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seen instead as agreements amongst employees to share the fruits of their
common labors with the collective, rather than jumping ship
opportunistically.
Because the fiduciary relationship would be with one’s co-venturers
in the economic enterprise, the relationship would more closely resemble
those business relationships with default rules of equal participation, such
as partnerships. Partners owe fiduciary duties to the partnership as a
separate entity as well as to their fellow partners in the aggregate.310
Employees would have similar duties within the context of the
employer.311 If employees do have governance rights, individual and
smaller groups of employees would still need protection against
opportunities by the voting majority to behave opportunistically and
deprive the minority of its fair share. But such duties would resemble the
shareholder “minority oppression” doctrine, rather than an agent’s
fiduciary duties.312 Under this doctrine, courts have equitable power to
309
310

Id.

ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 2 BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP §
6.07(a) (2004); Smith, supra note GSCRT, at 1458. Modern partnership law is engaged in
an ongoing debate as to whether a partnership is simply a collective of individuals
(aggregate theory) or is an entity unto itself (entity theory). This divergence reflects a
similar tension in the role of employees who participate in the firm’s governance.
311
Larry Ribstein has argued that in fact, partners should not all have fiduciary
responsibilities to each other; only those who have open-ended managerial discretion
should owe fiduciary duties. Ribstein, supra not LRAPF, at 215. According to Ribstein,
governance rights are not themselves sufficient to create fiduciary duties; there must be
some discretionary, managerial power over other owners to justify the imposition of such
duties. Id. at 237-40. The duties that partners would owe to each other under Ribstein’s
approach follow the duties that co-owners—co-participants in governance—owe to each
other. In fact, he raised concerns about the denigration of governance rights if fiduciary
duties were also imposed on top of the governance rights. Id. at 233. Ribstein’s approach
to nonmanaging partners would have similar resonance as to employees with governance
rights. On the other hand, employees with managerial discretion would owe fiduciary
duties, given the entrustment of the firm in their hands. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary
Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1289, 1293 (2011) (discussing the concept
of entrustment).
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Minority shareholder oppression occurs when the majority group in a closely-held
corporation uses its power over the corporation to deprive minority shareholders of
certain fruits or expected returns from the business. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder
Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L.
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adjust decisions made by controlling shareholders (or shareholder blocs)
that unfairly target minority shareholders and deprive them of their
proportional shareholder value.313 Minority oppression includes not only
conduct such as unfair buybacks or dividend distributions, but also
disproportionate employment salaries for majority owners or decisions to
terminate the employment of minority shareholders.314 It is a holistic
doctrine that tries to root out decisions that violate the boundaries of
fairness and the reasonable expectations of the parties.315 A similar
doctrine could apply to employees to make sure a majority bloc within the
employer did not use its power to disadvantage a minority bloc of
employees unfairly.316
REV. 749, 750 (2000) (“The doctrine of shareholder oppression protects the close
corporation minority stockholder from the improper exercise of majority control.”). For
example, majority shareholders may terminate a minority shareholder’s employment by
the company, depriving that shareholder of the expectations of a continued salary. See,
e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976)
(describing one type of shareholder oppression as “to deprive minority stockholders of
corporate offices and of employment with the corporation”). Some courts have
characterized the minority oppression doctrine in the language of fiduciary duty.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975)
(“Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the partnership, the
trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and the
inherent danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold that stockholders
in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the
operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another.”).
313
See Moll, supra note DM-Vand, at 759-61 (describing oppression doctrine and the
avenues of relief available to courts).
314
See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression v. Employment At Will in the Close
Corporation: The Investment Model Solution, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 517, 520 (1999)
(discussing the conflict between employment at-will and shareholder oppression doctrine
when at-will shareholders are terminated).
315
Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1199 (2010) (“In a growing number of jurisdictions, courts
evaluate claims of oppression by asking whether the majority has deprived the minority
of the objectively reasonable expectations that motivated its investment.”).
316
As with the minority oppression doctrine, the courts would need to walk a fine line
between the rights of the minority to minimum standards and the rights of the majority
to manage the business enterprise as it saw fit. Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based

Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Close
Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1211 (2009) (“Rather than insisting upon strained
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If employees participate in governance, the employer would not
have a duty not to use its discretion to take undue advantage of employees,
either individually or as a group. Instead, the governing group as a whole
would need to agree not to unfairly target minority interests within the
firm. These democratically-structured rights and duties would better align
the employee’s interests with the interests of the firm itself. As such, there
would be much less of a need for fiduciary protection. For those looking
to free the workplace of many of the employment and labor law
regulatory encumbrances,317 employee governance participation provides a
way to reduce these regulations without rendering employees unduly
vulnerable.
CONCLUSION
Employee fiduciary duties sit uneasily within agency doctrine: they
are clearly required by traditional doctrine, but their justifications have
become harder to defend. However, when seen within a more holistic
approach to the employment relationship, these duties are justified as a set
of protections for one’s fellow employees and the other participants in the
firm. If allowed to participate in firm governance, employees would
rightfully have duties against opportunism, and employers would simply
be fictional placeholders for the aggregate governance mechanisms they
would represent. On the other hand, if employers continue to fence
employees out of governance, stronger fiduciary responsibilities are
required to prevent employer opportunism. Either approach would be
superior to our current law, under which vulnerable employees owe illdefined fiduciary duties and employers have no reciprocal obligations.
comparisons to public corporation or partnership models of governance, courts should
minimize deterrents to minority investment by preventing majority shareholders from
taking unfair advantage of their power while also recognizing the majority shareholders'
right to benefit from control in order to encourage their investment.”). This is the work
that a vague word like “unfair” must take on within the doctrine.
317
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Contractual Solutions for Employment Law Problems, 38
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 789, 802 (2015) (“The best response today to labor market
regulation comes straight from Moses: ‘Let my people go.’”); cf. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The
Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 91 (2008) (arguing for
simplification of employment law through a uniform unjust dismissal law).

